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One of the greatest challenges facing the United States after a concerted 
terrorist attack is that of coordinating response from the myriad of resources 
available to the incident commander.  During this crisis, the daunting task facing 
the Information Technology (IT) community is to bring a myriad of disparate 
systems and their relevant traffic together to provide the incident commander a 
picture of what is happening on the ground, a common operating picture, and 
then to push that picture up to the decision makers at the state and federal 
levels.  
This thesis will examine current organizational structures, missions and IT 
architectures within the United States Department of Homeland Security, United 
States Northern Command and the United States National Guard. In addition, 
this thesis will propose that one solution to bridge the divide between the 
disparate agencies that may respond to an emergency such as a natural disaster 
or a terrorist Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) may lie within the National 
Guard.  With its unique role as a state militia and a federal warfighter, the 
National Guard is particularly well positioned to bridge this divide by augmenting 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Many of the communication issues that exist today within the community 
that responds to the United States’ emergencies have existed for years.  The 
events of September 11, 2001 (9-11) demonstrated that our communications 
systems, while powerful and far reaching, do not always have the capability to 
communicate amongst themselves. More importantly, the events of 9-11 gave 
our Nation a sense of urgency in solving these issues.  To have one of the 
world’s most advanced communications systems, but not be able to 
communicate at the incident site, disturbs our moral conscience and on 9-11 
many lives within the first responder community were lost due to communications 
equipment that could not deliver vital messages about the imminent collapse of 
the towers to all involved.  In this instance, the different agencies responding to 
the crisis were able to share information amongst their own group, but not with 
others.  During the early hours after the first aircraft crashed into the twin towers, 
the Mayor could not effectively communicate with the on-scene police and fire 
department commanders due to disparate radio networks.  This deficiency 
became even more acute as the system provided to the fire department could not 
communicate the imminent collapse of the towers to the fire personnel that were 
inside the buildings, while the police warnings to their personnel got through. The 
lack of interoperability between those two FM communications systems led to 
dozens if not hundreds of deaths.  
 It is recognized at all levels within the United States government that 
Information Technology (IT) has an important role to play in securing our 
homeland and there is no shortage of resources. In Fiscal Year 2003, the 
President’s budget for government wide IT was 56.1 billion dollars. (GAO Report 
on Homeland Security Funding and Management Issues, 2002, p. 12) The 
General Accounting Office (GAO) identified four specific roles that IT has in 
securing the homeland in their report to Congress on Homeland Security IT 
funding and management.  In the report, the GAO stated,    
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Information technology (IT) will play a critical role in strengthening 
our nation's homeland security against potential future attacks. 
Specifically, IT will help enable the nation to identify potential 
threats, share information more readily, provide mechanisms to 
protect our homeland, and develop response capabilities. (GAO 
Report on Homeland Security Funding and Management Issues, 
2002, p. 2) 
In August of 2003, the GAO reported that with regard to current information and 
intelligence sharing processes, state and local agencies 
identified three systemic problems. First, they believe that needed 
information is not routinely provided. Second, the information that 
they do receive is not always timely, accurate, or relevant. Third, 
they feel that the federal government still perceives the fight against 
terrorism to be generally a federal responsibility and consequently 
does not integrate state and city governments into the information-
sharing process. (GAO Report, Homeland Security, Efforts to 
Improve Information Sharing Need to be Strengthened, 2003, p. 20) 
The digital divide at the incident response site has been created as IT falls short 
of its role in securing the homeland.  This is due to its failure to provide timely, 
accurate and relevant data at the right place and at the right time.  
The investment required to replace the communications infrastructure in 
the United States simply is too large for us to undertake. It is essential that some 
agency be tasked to respond to the scene of a disaster and bring with it not only 
the technical capability to bridge the communications divide between local, state 
and federal responders, but also the legal capability.  This thesis will examine 
current organizational structures, missions, and IT architectures within the 
Department of Homeland Security, Northern Command, and the National Guard 
and provide one of many potential solutions to help bridge the divide between the 
disparate agencies that may respond to an emergency such as a natural disaster 
or a terrorist Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD).  This thesis proposes that the 
National Guard, with its unique role as a state militia and a federal warfighter, is 
uniquely positioned to fulfill this mission by augmenting its existing IT 
infrastructure and personnel, bridging the incident response digital divide. 
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II.  LOCAL INCIDENT RESPONSE 
To study how best to support the local community and its first responders, 
it is important to first understand the situation at the incident site and how the 
local governments operate.  In a report issued in August of 2003, the GAO found 
that, 
Since September 11, 2001, federal, state, and city governments 
have established initiatives to improve the sharing of information to 
prevent terrorism. Many of these initiatives were implemented by 
states and cities and not necessarily coordinated with other sharing 
initiatives, including those by federal agencies. At the same time, 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has initiatives under 
way to enhance information sharing, including the development of a 
homeland security blueprint, known as an “enterprise architecture,” 
to integrate sharing between federal, state, and city authorities. 
(GAO Report, Homeland Security, Efforts to Improve Information 
Sharing Need to be Strengthened, 2003, p. 2) 
  In a democratic open society such as the United States, it is inevitable 
that every state, city and local municipality will be different leading to disparate 
communications networks servicing different governmental agencies. In some 
municipalities there is a central figure, such as the Mayor of New York, who is in 
command of the incident response on the local level and all city agencies report 
to him, while in some municipalities, there is no central figure other than a sheriff 
or a constable who must build a response from agencies not under their control.  
This very fact is one of the key issues facing a unified response to any incident 
site in support of the local responders.  It is extremely difficult to build a standard 
operating procedure for response when the situation at the incident site can be 
extremely diverse.  No matter what type of local governmental system is in place, 
there remains the need to communicate horizontally within the response 
agencies and vertically from the incident to the incident commander and above to 




 A. THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER 
In most local responses, the 911 emergency networks direct the initial 
allocation of resources to support the incident.  This network will dispatch field 
units, initiate and transfer calls to other dispatch centers, and notify the state or 
county Emergency Operations Center (EOC) if necessary.  Much of the incident 
response is based upon predetermined criteria and can be extremely difficult to 
coordinate.  This is due to the fact that a significant portion of the county-wide 
response is at times made up of non-county responders such as state police, 
military, federal, state and city agencies to include non-governmental 
organizations such as the Red Cross and private industry such as the local 
utilities. (Scott, 2003, p. 64)  Typically, the EOC of a jurisdiction is not fully 
manned 24 hours a day, and only becomes so in response to a particular 
incident.  According to Scott in his thesis, 
When activated the EOC is typically staffed with representatives, 
but not directors of the various county agencies, other governments 
and NGO’s.  The “Commander” of the EOC controls the operations 
of the EOC itself, but often does not have the authority to direct the 
response provided by an agency represented at the EOC….the 
EOC serves as a focal point for cooperation between the county 
and the non-county government agencies that might be affected by 
the crisis, including cities within the county, federal facilities located 
within the county, neighboring EOC and the…state EOC (Scott, 
2003, p. 65) 
 The infrastructure that supports the local EOC is as varied as the make up 
of the counties and cities themselves, but the typical EOC is similar to the 
Monterey EOC that Scott studied in his thesis.  In Monterey, the prime 
communications method the members of the EOC staff use to communicate with 
their agencies is the telephone.  There are a number of shared computer 
workstations that provide connection to the Internet, email for each of the 
established EOC positions and a number of Local Area Network (LAN) drops for 
those members who have laptop computers.  The EOC utilizes voice-only 
satellite radio and high frequency 150 MHz radios as its backup in case the 
public switched telephone service is disrupted.  In addition, it has a number of 
software systems, the Response Information Management System (RIMS) and 
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the Emergency Digital Information System (EDIS), to publish text message traffic 
throughout the state.  Communications with the responders at the incident site 
are provided by cell phone and radio. (Scott, 2003, p. 68) 
 
B. THE INCIDENT SITE 
At the incident site, the incident commander is in charge.  The agency 
fielding the incident commander is determined by the type of incident, the 
agencies available for response and the political environment within that 
jurisdiction.  In most situations, the incident commander can control those 
agencies and assets that respond to the incident site, de-conflicting responses, 
but does not have the authority to requisition additional assets.  The incident 
commander is not a leader in the military sense and the majority of decisions at 
the incident site will be made through consensus with the responding agencies.  
In the early hours of a severe crisis, this is a critical problem that can only be 
overcome through instant and accurate communications amongst all local, state, 
and federal agencies that have assets available to the incident commander.  The 
incident commander must understand the situation at hand, what assets are 
available for their use, and how to access those assets. 
The infrastructure at the incident site is far less capable and more varied 
than the infrastructure seen at the EOC and above.  An example of this is in the 
way information is shared.  While at the EOC, all parties sit within close proximity 
and computers fuse data for aggregated information flow, often the response 
assets are not integrated in order to provide a common operating picture at the 
incident. The primary means of communication at the incident site is hand-held 
radio and cell phone.  Many of the agencies responding to the incident utilize 
their own particular band or frequency for said traffic and as such, cannot 
communicate horizontally in order to coordinate the response.  This was 
evidenced in graphic detail in the response to 9-11 when the New York Police 
Department issued a warning that the towers were about to collapse and the 
New York Fire Department members could not and did not receive this warning.  
It is a fact that many lives were lost due to this lack of rudimentary capability. 
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The problem expressed in this section has three facets.  First, how can we 
bridge the communications gap at the incident site in order to coordinate and 
manage response?  Second, how can we bridge the communications gap at the 
EOC level and higher to efficiently manage resources and provide the incident 
commander with the appropriate mix of responses at the appropriate time and at 
the appropriate place?  Lastly, how can we mine the information from multiple 
incident sites and EOCs, bridging the communications gap and providing a 
common operating picture at all levels of government from the Governor to the 
President, in order to have an understanding of the entire scenario that may be 
unfolding?  In the following sections, I will try to provide an understanding of the 
federal players in this arena, the National Guard, United States Northern 
Command (USNORTHCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
showing the unique position of the National Guard and its IT infrastructure in 







                                           
III. THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL GUARD 
The National Guard, consisting of fifty-four state and territorial entities (i.e., 
Guam National Guard), principally serves under the command of the relevant 
state or territorial Governor for missions including response to civil disorder and 
natural disasters.  When federalized for combat or national security missions, 
however, each State National Guard serves under the command of the 
President.  Thus, sometimes the Guard's homeland security mission will be 
determined at the state and territorial level and, at other times, at the federal 
level.   
 
A. THE CONNECTICUT STATE MILITIA 
In order to better understand how the National Guard relates to the local 
communities and how it is postured in this ever changing environment to serve 
as the bridge between the local, state and federal response during time of 
disaster, it is important to understand its lineage.  In an attempt to explain this 
lineage and its ties to the community, I will present the Connecticut State Militia 
as a case study of how the National Guard was formed beginning in 1636. 
The 17th Century was a time of war between the settlers of what is now 
Connecticut and the American Indian Pequot nation. (Walsh, 1991, p.6)  In 1636, 
the Pequots attacked the Dutch settlement at Saybrook and skirmished as far 
north as Wethersfield, forcing the settlers to form the first community based 
militia.  On May 15, 1636, John Mason, a captain in the British “trainband”1 
tradition, was ordered by the General Court to raise men from the communities of 
Hartford, Windsor and Wethersfield to counter the Pequot threat. (Walsh, 1991, 
p. 9)  The method of this group’s formation is the very foundation of how today’s 
National Guard is built.  In 1636, Mason sailed down the Connecticut River and 
formed the first Connecticut Militia with volunteers from the communities and 
 
1 “trainband” The term draws its roots from an English tradition in which the English Militia 
was formed by a trained band of men whose instruments were that of war, not music. (Walsh, 
1991, p. 6) 
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fielded this group as town militia companies rather than as units comprised of 
individuals from disparate locations.  This tradition can still be found in many 
National Guard units today.   
In March of 1637, Mason was titled “publique military officer of the 
plantacions of Connecticut” (Walsh, 1991, p. 10) by the General Court.  In 
addition, the Court established the roots of today’s National Guard “drill” and 
“Annual Training (AT)”2 by ordering that a magazine of shot and powder be 
established in four communities and that all men aged sixteen to sixty bear arms 
and attend ten days of training annually. (Walsh, 1991, p. 10) 
As stated earlier, these militia bands were organized by town, but on June 
26, 1672 the regimental system was adopted to better serve the colony as a 
whole. (Walsh, 1991, p.12)  These regiments, formed in 1672 as the Regiments 
of Hartford, New Haven and Fairfield Counties, continue with unbroken service in 
today’s National Guard as the 169th Infantry Regiment, the 102 Infantry 
Regiment and the 192 Field Artillery Regiment, respectively. 
The origination of the National Guard within the United States began at 
the founding of our country.  Article I, Section Eight of the Constitution states, 
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts 
and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense 
and general welfare of the United States; …To raise and support 
armies, but no appropriation of money shall be for a term longer 
than two years; …To provide for the calling forth the militia to 
execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel 
invasions; to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining, the 
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in 
the service of the United States, reserving to the states 
respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of 
training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by 
Congress.   (US Constitution, Article I, Section 8) 
There are two points within this excerpt that are especially critical to 
understanding the dual role of the National Guard.  The first is that though the 
Congress has the right to call forth the militia, it reserves “to the states 
 
2 “Drill”, “Annual Training” Today’s National Guard “drills” one weekend a month and 
performs two weeks of Annual Training a year. 
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respectively” the day to day operation and training of the National Guard, and the 
appointment of its officers.  These two points are still true to this day and shape 
how the National Guard interacts within the United States on multiple levels. 
In 1916, the National Defense Act changed the State Militias from a state 
based force to the “principal” reserve component for the United States Army and 
made mandatory the title for the reserve component the “National Guard” (Van 
Fleet, 2002, p.10) 
The National Guard as it stands today has a proud history and foundation 
in its communities.  It is made up of soldiers and airmen that perform their military 
duties during “drills” much as the militiamen in 1636 did.  When these soldiers 
and airmen are not in uniform, they are the community; they are the people who 
make up the local, state and federal levels.  There is much made about the 
interface between these levels of government and community in time of crisis.  In 
his thesis conclusion, Edward Lockwood makes the point that, 
…the Army National Guard’s unique ability to reach and harness 
the power of American communities is a national asset.  It provides 
the ability to use the best America has to offer and our national 
spirit of volunteerism.  It is an untapped resource that when 
managed correctly demonstrates the best in civil-military relations 
and civilian control of the military. (Lockwood, 2003, p. 64) 
In the Reserve Component Employment Study (RCES) of 2005, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction stated, 
The Reserve Component (RC) are dispersed regionally throughout 
the nation, are populated with community residents, and have 
established ties with local authorities. These unique characteristics 
make them prime candidates for supporting missions such as 
assisting civil agencies in the management of the consequences of 
a WMD attack (WMD CM) or providing physical security for critical 
assets such as key infrastructure nodes. (Under Secretary of 
Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, 2004, p. 66) 
The National Guard and its unique mix of community based participants 
are poised to take a leading role protecting the Homeland. 
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B.  TITLE 10, TITLE 32, STATE ACTIVE DUTY 
The National Defense Act of 1933 is the most important piece of this 
legislation and that which is most germane to this thesis and to the National 
Guard’s role in homeland security and homeland defense. The National Defense 
Act of 1933 established the two identities of the National Guard; it established the 
National Guard of the United States and the National Guard of the Several 
States. The National Guard of the United States is the National Guard that is a 
deployable asset for the Active Army and Air Force, Title 10 United States Code 
(USC), and the National Guard of the Several States is the State Militia, Title 32 
USC, which is deployable by the Governor in response to State emergency. (Van 
Fleet, 2002, p. 10)  According to Edward Lockwood in his thesis,  
The 1933 amendments to the National Defense Act of 1920 
provided the legal basis for the State National Guard entities to 
become the Army National Guard of the United States when 
federally mobilized.  In essence, the 1933 amendments recognized 
the dual nature of the Army National Guard as a state and federal 
entity, a kind of dual citizenship in the profession of arms. 
(Lockwood, 2003, p. 39) 
He goes on to say that, 
In recognizing that the Army National Guard is a reserve of the 
Army, the Army created a situation by which the Army National 
Guard units could mobilize as units and deploy overseas in support 
of the foreign policy of the United States. (Lockwood, 2003, p. 39) 
The National Guard, through its dual missions, can and does bridge the 
gap between state and federal levels on a regular basis, whereas most state and 
federal agencies are just that, state or federal.  This unique ability is stated very 
clearly in the 2005 National Guard Posture Statement: 
The Guard was there when it was needed, demonstrating the 
flexible accessibility inherent in the unique multi-status roles of the 
Guard.  Our Homeland Defense and Security roles mandate that 
we be capable of seamlessly operating in federal and state 
intergovernmental and interagency roles.  September 11th and its 
aftermath are illustrative of the Guard’s new operating environment 
and its unique flexibility to respond to our nations needs. (NGB, 
2005 National Guard Posture Statement, 2004, p. 1) 
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The days and months following September 11th illustrate a specific case whereby 
the advantage of a dual role National Guard was demonstrated.  Four days after 
the attack, the President of the United States determined that it was essential to 
re-open the nation’s commercial airports that had been shut down since 9-11.  To 
provide additional security and a sense of comfort to the American public, the 
President decided to emplace military forces in the airports.  The Posse 
Comitatus Act of 1878 states that, 
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly 
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any 
part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise 
to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than two years, or both. (US Code Collection, 2004, p. 1) 
Therefore, it is forbidden to utilize the federal military to perform law enforcement 
missions such as airport security.  Leveraging the dual role of the National 
Guard, the President called upon the Governors to activate the National Guard 
under Title 32 for the airport security mission.  This mission was performed in 
Title 32 status until its conclusion a year later. 
 In addition to the two identities established by the 1933 amendments to 
the Defense Act of 1920, there exists a third identity for the National Guard.  The 
Governors in accordance with the laws of their particular State may activate their 
National Guard under State Active Duty to fulfill a State mission.  Under this 
particular identity, the National Guard is paid directly from the State coffers and is 
under the command of the Governor.  
 
C. THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU 
In 1916, the National Defense Act restructured the division of Militia Affairs 
into a separate Militia Bureau and assigned two full-time National Guard officers 
to the Militia Bureau that had, as the Division of Militia Affairs, been staffed with 
Regular Army officers.  In January 1921, an amendment to the National Defense 
Act stated that the Chief of the Militia Bureau would be selected from a list of 
National Guard officers.  This billet had been a Regular Army billet up until this 
12 
                                           
point.  The Chief of today’s National Guard Bureau is nominated by the 
Governors of the states, appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate.   In 1933, The National Defense Act renamed the Militia Bureau to the 
National Guard Bureau (NGB) and established the National Guard as a reserve 
component.  (Van Fleet, 2002, pp. 9-10)   
The NGB serves to manage the federal funds utilized in the training and 
operation of the National Guard and is the official channel of communication from 
the respective service to the state or territorial National Guard as stated in Title 
10, USC, Part I chapter 1011, Section 10501(b).   
…the channel of communications on all matters pertaining to the 
National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States and 
the Air National Guard of the United States between the 
Department of Army and the Department of Air Force and the 
several States. (Title 10, USC, Part I chapter 1011, Section 
10501(b)) 
According to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB), Army Lieutenant 
General H. Steven Blum as he briefed the Joint Staff in April of 2004, the mission 
of the NGB is: 
 To acquire, manage, and distribute Army and Air National 
Guard resources; to develop and administer policies and programs 
in support of the National Security Strategy; to act as the “Channel 
of Communications” between the Services and the National Guard 
of the States, Territories and the District of Columbia as well as 
other internal and external agencies for the successful 
accomplishment of CONUS and OCONUS missions. (NGB, 
NGvision Brief, 2004, p. 2)3
This mission statement hits upon both of the National Guard Bureau’s missions 
and demonstrates the role that it plays.  As stated in the previous section on the 
history of the National Guard, there are two National Guards, the National Guard 
of the United States (federal status) and the National Guard of the several States 
(state status).  The NGB does not have any command relationships with either of 
these Guard structures.  In federal status, the Guard members report through the 
active component to the President of the United States as Commander in Chief 
 
3 CONUS (Continental United States), OCONUS (Outside Continental United States) 
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and in state status, the Guard members report to their respective Governors.  
The National Guard Bureau is simply a channel of communications between the 
services and the states and a conduit for federal funds into the States.  
Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, the current CNGB, demonstrates the 
significance of what the NGB does through his vision for the NGB, as stated in 
his vision brief. 
 To “provide for the common defense”…of the nation, the 
National Guard Bureau provides the leadership and resources 
required to set the standard for the world’s premier reserve force, 
the National Guard of the United States. Our destiny is to respond 
to current and future worldwide commitments of the National 
Security Strategy with community-based, dedicated, citizen-soldiers 
and airmen; well-trained, organized, and supported with state of the 
art technology and equipment. (NGB, NGvision Brief, 2004, p. 2) 
 
1. Organization 
In 2004, the National Guard Bureau was reorganized into a Joint Staff that 
closely mirrored that which exists within the DoD in the headquarters at the 
Pentagon.  This staff was divided into eight main sections.  A Memorandum from 
Major General Sullivan, the Director of the Joint Staff dictated that, 
The term “NGB Joint Staff” is defined as the J1 through J8 
directorates, the Special Staff and Personal Staff elements. 
(Sullivan, 2004, p. 1) 
Figure 1 (Sullivan, 2004, p. 2) details the Organizational Chart for the National 
Guard Bureau as outlined by Major General Sullivan. 
 
 
Figure 1. NGB Organization Chart 
 
Much of this organization is the same as a typical Joint Staff, but there are 
two branches of the tree that are unique to the National Guard Bureau.  These 
are the branches directly under the Chief of the National Guard (CNGB) and his 
special staff, that branch to the left and right.  These branches lead to the 
Directors of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, Lieutenant 
General Schultz and Lieutenant General James.  These two positions command 
their own staffs and work very closely with the parent services, the Army and the 
Air Force, in order to integrate the Guard into the total force.  They are advisors 
to the CNGB on matters pertaining to their respective service and work very 
closely with the Director of the Joint Staff.  The NGB Joint Staff answers directly 
to the Director of the Joint Staff and ultimately to the CNGB, but does not answer  
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to the Director of the Army National Guard or the Director of the Air National 
Guard.  In his memo, Major General Sullivan stated the mission of the Joint Staff 
as 
The Joint Staff assists the Chief, NGB in accomplishing his 
responsibilities for strategic direction of the National Guard Forces; 
their operation under unified command; and their integration into an 
efficient team of land and air forces. (Sullivan, 2004, p. 1) 
A major change within the National Guard Bureau that occurred during this 
reorganization is the inclusion in the Joint Staff of both Navy and Marine Corps 
personnel on the staff.  Prior to the reorganization, the staff was made up of only 
Army and Air Force personnel.  The inclusion of Navy and Marine Corps 
personnel is intended to better round the staff and provide input to the CNGB 
from all components.   
 
2. NGBJ6/CIO 
To meet both its state and federal missions, the National Guard maintains 
an interconnected information technology infrastructure within and across the 
fifty-four states and territories. Most of the infrastructure, the wiring and the 
equipment, as well as the people, who manage and maintain it, are under the 
command of the relevant state or territorial Governor; some of the 
interconnecting infrastructure, however, is federally funded and controlled. 
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, LTG Blum, summarized well the 
role of the NGB-J6.  He stated, 
I want you leveraging all the Army’s systems and all the Air 
Systems to come up with the best purple systems ultimately.  
…We’re going to lead from the rear.  The Guard is actually going to 
push a much, much bigger DoD in the right direction. (Blum, 2003, 
p. 6) 
The NGB J6’s primary role is to do just what LTG Blum stated: to leverage Army 
and Air Guard IT systems in order to create a NGB enterprise system.  As stated 
in the NGB IT Vision/Mission Brief, the mission of the NGB J6 is, 
To acquire, manage, and distribute Army and Air National Guard IT 
resources to develop and administer IT policies and programs in 
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support of the National Security Strategy; to act as the “Channel of 
Communications” on IT issues between the Services and the 
National Guard of the States, Territories, and the District of 
Columbia as well as other internal and external agencies for the 
successful accomplishment of CONUS and OCONUS missions. 
(NGB, NGB IT Vision/Mission Brief, 2004, p. 2) 
In order to support this mission, the National Guard has deployed a nationwide IT 
infrastructure.  Figure 2 (NGB, JettCon Shared Usage Brief, 2001, p. 6) illustrates 
the multiple missions that the National Guard IT infrastructure supports.  The 
NGB J6 must integrate all voice, video, and data into an enterprise wide solution 
that will support the missions of: 
• Readiness:  The “go-to war” mission.  This includes all training and 
preparation in support of National Guard warfighting capabilities. 
• Counterdrug:  One of the National Guard’s Military Assistance to 
Civilian Authorities (MACA) missions. 
• Stability and Support: The National Guard’s primary state mission, 
responding within the state in times of emergency and natural 
disaster. 
• Shared Usage:  A congressionally mandated mission to make the 
National Guard’s Distributed Training Technology Program 
available to anyone on a space available, reimbursable basis. 
• State Partnership Program:  The National Guard mission partnering 
with friendly nations in partnership to facilitate education and 
training in support of national objectives. 
• Family and Youth Programs:  Programs like STARBASE and Youth 
ChalleNGe that work with disadvantaged youth in order to give 
them the skills required to succeed.  Additionally, providing support 
to family members of deployed soldiers and airmen. 
 
Figure 2. National Guard IT Missions 
 
• Homeland Security: The National Guard’s mission at home to 
secure the homeland and to respond to any terrorist incident such 
as 9-11. 
• Information Operations/Assurance:  The National Guard’s mission 
to secure the electronic traffic that flows through the United States 
and to prevent disruptions to service and operations. 
This integration of National Guard IT into an enterprise was recently recognized 
by LTG Blum in his speech to the Joint IT Conference.  He stated that the NGB 
IT community must, 
…get the Air Warrior Net, and the GuardNet and RCAS to come 
together.  So we have a much more powerful enterprise system. 
(Blum, 2003, p. 7)   
In subsequent sections, this thesis will describe each of these National Guard 
systems and how they can serve to enhance homeland security and bridge the 
digital divide at the incident site. 
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3. GuardNet XXI 
GuardNet XXI is a congressionally funded information network that 
currently features an Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) backbone providing 
terrestrial and satellite connectivity to all 54 States, Territories and the District of 
Columbia into over 3300 Armories and Airbases.  Figure 3 (RCAS Summary, 
2004, p. 1) depicts the multiple Interfaces into GuardNet XXI that provide high 
speed information access in support of multiple missions. 
 
 
Figure 3. GuardNet XXI connections 
 
   
The Wide Area Network (WAN) that connects the National Guard’s 
nationwide infrastructure, GuardNet XXI, consists of a hub and spoke 
architecture with seven major hubs located in the states of Virginia, North 
Carolina, Iowa, California, Wyoming, Arkansas and New York and provides 
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telecommunications through a Dual DS34 backbone with a minimum of a T15 
connection into each State and Territory as illustrated in Figure 4. (NGB, JettCon 
Shared Usage Brief, 2001, p. 8) Currently, the circuits that make up GuardNet 
XXI are leased through the Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) 2001 
contract and are provided by MCI.  GuardNet XXI is an unclassified network that 
is accredited at the level of Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU).   
 
Figure 4. GuardNet XXI current configuration 
 
At this writing, GuardNet XXI is undergoing a modernization project in 
order to capitalize on new technology and to provide significant increases in 
bandwidth, security, flexibility and redundancy.  In October 2004, the projected 
completion date of the modernization, GuardNet XXI will have changed from the 
current ATM architecture of hub and spoke to Sprint’s peerless Internet Protocol 
(IP) network pictured in Figure 5.  (NGB, NGB Brief Kickoff, 2003, p. 7)  As of 
July of 2004, this modernization project was on schedule. 
                                            
4 DS3 circuit provides 45 million bits per second (Mbps) of throughput. 
5 T1 Circuit provides 1.54 Mbps throughput. 
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This network will be leased from Sprint and will increase the amount of 
bandwidth available to the National Guard for its missions and those of its 
federal, state and local partners from 45 Mbps to 155 Mbps.  The Sprint network 
allows for dynamic routing which will allow any connection to be routed over the 
best, least congested path from origination to destination.  This will reduce the 
number of hops traffic will be required to take in order to arrive at its destination.  
 
Figure 5. Sprint Peerless IP Network6
 
This architecture eliminates the single points of failure that currently exist in the 
ATM design by allowing the network to reroute traffic dynamically in response to 
changing conditions.  In this design, no one device failure can or will bring down 
the network.  Figure 6 (NGB, NGB Brief Kickoff, 2003, p. 11) shows the new 
architecture for GuardNet XXI and demonstrates the multiple paths through 
Sprint’s network that can be utilized if one arc goes down. Another significant 
change to GuardNet XXI is the conversion of the backbone from ATM to IP.  This 
change required significant change to the National Guard’s Distance Learning 
(DL) program, the Distributive Training Technology Project (DTTP), which will be 
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6OC3 provides 155 Mbps throughput and an OC98 provides 9000 Mbps or 9 Gbps throughput. 
discussed in the DTTP section.  The previous design was constructed mainly to 
support ATM video teleconferences (VTC) and required transcoding of all IP 
traffic from IP to ATM at the nearest hub in order to transit the network, then 
transcoding it back to IP at the destination hub.  This can cause significant 
latency and causes increased cost and complexity.  Since the advent of IP VTC, 
it is now possible to combine all traffic on one network utilizing Virtual Private 
Networks (VPN) and avoid the necessity of transcoding traffic. 
 
Figure 6. GuardNet XXI Meshed IP Virtual Network Tunnels 
 
The new GuardNet XXI architecture also provides for additional security from the 
previous design.  Sprint’s peerless IP network is a private IP backbone where the 
National Guard will have its own dedicated fiber in order to carry its traffic.  This 
private network is physically removed from the public switch network where the 
Internet resides, unlike the current architecture. Figure 7 (NGB, NGB Brief 
Kickoff, 2003, p. 12) illustrates the private IP network and how National Guard 
traffic will be secure through the use of a General Routing Encapsulation (GRE) 
tunnel which will include IP Security encryption.  This design provides two large 
improvements from the current design, as it is physically removed from the 
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Internet, and within the private network, it is segregated and encrypted.  GRE 
Tunneling allows the National Guard to encapsulate the data packets and 
encrypt them so that the contents of the packet are not discernable enroute.  The 
only information seen on these packets as they transit the network is the 
origination point and the destination.  These features make the likelihood of any 
party outside of GuardNet XXI being able to gain unauthorized access to the 




Figure 7. GuardNet XXI Enterprise Routing7
 
 
                                            
7 OSPF is defined as “Open Shortest Path First” and is a form of dynamic routing 
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4. The Air National Guard Enterprise Network 
Due to the fact that the Air National Guard is funded through the Air Force 
and has unique requirements separate from the Army National Guard, the Air 
National Guard maintains its own network separate from GuardNet XXI.  The Air 
Guard Enterprise Network (ANGEN) consists of six regions connected to the 
Defense Information Systems Network (DISN), which is covered later in this 
thesis.  This regional topology is depicted in Figure 8. (NGB, ANG Enterprise 
Network Architecture Profile, 2003, p. 5) 
 
Figure 8. ANGEN regional topology 
 
The ANGEN connects 88 flying wings/bases and 200 geographically separated 
units to the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Air Force and the rest 
of DoD through its connection with DISN. (NGB, ANG Enterprise Network 
Architecture Profile, 2003, p. 4)  At the National Guard Bureau, the Air National 
Guard maintains a Network Operations and Security Center (NOSC), which 
operates as the management center for each of the regional nodes containing 
Regional Operations and Security Centers (ROSC). The ROSCs are connected 
directly to the DISN and provide T1 connectivity to the 88 flying wings/bases with 
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an average of 15 wings/bases per ROSC.  Each wings and base manages their 
own LAN to provide services on the facility.  This architecture and management 
platform is depicted in Figure 9. (NGB, ANG Enterprise Network Architecture 
Profile, 2003, p. 5)   
 
Figure 9. ANGEN Management Platform 
 
5. The Air National Guard Warrior Network 
In addition to the terrestrial based GuardNet XXI managed by the Army 
National Guard and the ANGEN, the Air National Guard maintains a satellite 
based network called the Warrior Network or WarriorNet.  WarriorNet consists of 
3 (1.2 mbps – 4 mbps) uplinks to the TelStar 6 satellite which is owned by 
IntelSat Inc. and over 154 downlinks throughout the United States.  The 
WarriorNet architecture is depicted in Figure 10. (NGB, NGB IT Brief to the 
United Kingdom ADL Partnership Lab, 2002, p. 30) Through the WarriorNet 
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downlink and utilizing phone bridging, WarriorNet delivers one way video and two 
way audio communications.   
 
Figure 10. Warrior Network Architecture 
 
Many of the WarriorNet downlinks are co-located with DTTP classrooms and as 
such, the satellite feed and phone bridging can be pushed through GuardNet XXI 
as a VTC to all of the 320 DTTP locations.  WarriorNet provides an alternative 
means of communications to the State and local level and provides the National 
Guard with a back up system should GuardNet XXI fail. 
 
6. The Distributive Training Technology Project 
The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is committed to achieving its primary 
missions of military readiness, rapid response to federal and state needs, and 
support to peacekeeping operations by leveraging the best instructional 
methodologies, information systems and communications technologies to deliver 
education, training, and performance-enhancing tools.  
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The Army's in-force structure changes have placed a heavy burden on the 
National Guard to retrain soldiers from one military specialty to another.  In the 
past, such retraining required transporting soldiers to distant classrooms - a 
costly and time-consuming process.  Budget constraints and fiscal responsibility 
have made it financially unfeasible for the Guard to continue retraining soldiers in 
this manner.  
The Distributive Training Technology Project (DTTP) gives significant 
opportunity to the Guard to maintain the required readiness, and offset the cost 
of the program.  The advantages of the program to readiness include that it:  
• Increases the number of soldiers that can be trained at the same 
time, lowering the cost of instructors and transportation. 
• Reduces the amount of time it takes to deliver requisite training to 
multiple large groups. 
• Broadens the scope of education, making more information 
available to more people at the same time. 
GuardNet XXI currently connects more than 320 multimedia classrooms 
illustrated in Figure 11, (NGB, Army Knowledge Symposium Brief, 2003, p. 15) 
ranging in size from two to thirty seats.  Current plans call for the installation of 
478 classrooms in total by the end of 2006.  Communications capabilities include 
two-way audio and two-way video-teleconferencing, tele-training and Internet 
access.  
DTTP's primary mission is to promote military readiness throughout the 
Guard and other military organizations by offering access to Advanced 
Distributed Learning (ADL) tools, technologies, and courseware. Other missions 
are to enhance command, control, communications, and computers (C4) 
capabilities; and to make DTTP resources available to other public and private 
agencies on a cost-reimbursable basis.  Because of the network's reliability, 
DTTP resources have been used to provide communications and other support 
during times of crisis.  Even before 9-11, for example, project personnel were 
working to leverage the DTTP system and its network capabilities to support C4 
requirements for homeland security.  As a result, the DTTP was able to 
distinguish itself as a crucial and reliable communications tool in the wake of the 
terrorist strikes on the World Trade Center (WTC).  Project personnel established 
and sustained a critical, continuous 24-hour communications link among National 
Guard commands in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.  Command staffs 
at these sites used the link to coordinate emergency responses, deploy troops, 
and resolve logistical problems - at a time when land-line and cellular networks 
were overcome by volume.  In Washington, the DTTP also connected National 
Guard leadership in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia after the 
Pentagon attack.  Unfortunately, even using DTTP, the State National Guards 
were not able to integrate all facets of communications.   
In addition, the NGB, in partnership with such organizations as the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), and the National Terrorism Preparedness Institute (NTPI) has 
been using its terrestrial and satellite networks to support emergency-response 
training utilizing an existing cooperative agreement framework which allows the 
shared usage of federal assets by local citizens.   
 




Since 9-11, the National Guard has supported more than 20 satellite 
teleconferences for military and civilian emergency-response communities at 
more than 500 locations around the country. 
A typical DTTP classroom consists of the following equipment and capabilities: 
• Tandberg IP video teleconference equipment 
• Internet access 
• 2 to 33 networked computer workstations (10 average) 
• overhead projector 
• document camera 
• printer and fax machine 
• audio conference capability 
• WarriorNet downlink (100 classrooms) 
 
7. The Reserve Component Automation System 
The Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS), a successful 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1A program, is an automated information 
management system that serves the Army Guard and the United States Army 
Reserve forces.  The RCAS mission is to, 
…support daily operational, training, and administrative tasks for all 
Guard and Reserve echelons, and provide timely and more 
accurate information to plan and support mobilization. RCAS links 
approximately 10,500 Guard and Reserve units at approximately 
4,000 sites located in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, 
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Europe, and the Pacific Rim. 
(RCAS Website, 2004, p. 1) 
RCAS consists of a Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) Personal Computer (PC) 
based open architecture.  According to the RCAS summary brief, RCAS currently  
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consists of 3857 sites and a total of 57,867 PCs. (NGB, RCAS summary brief, 
2002, p. 33) The RCAS system is connected via Guardnet XXI as depicted in 
Figure 3.  
 In addition to the hardware fielded through the RCAS program, eight 
increments of software packages have been fielded from 1996 through 2003.  
According to the RCAS summary, those software increments provide the 
following capabilities. (RCAS Website, 2004, p. 1) 
• COTS office automation software (Microsoft Inc. Windows based) 
• Logistics 
• Force Authorization 
• Security 
• Training 
• Human resource management 
• Occupational health 
• Mobilization planning 
• Force Management 
Currently, RCAS is in the life cycle support stage of its program, having 
successfully fielded all eight increments of hardware and software.  RCAS 
provides a point of presence in every state and territory and can be leveraged 
through GuardNet XXI and the Joint CONUS Communications Support 
Environment, discussed in the next section, to enhance the flow of information 
between the incident site and the federal, state and local agencies. 
 
          8. The Joint CONUS Communications Support Environment 
The Joint CONUS Communications Support Environment (JCCSE), as 
shown in Figure 12, (NGB, J3 Conference Brief, 2004, p. 5) is a construct that 
the National Guard Bureau envisions will provide National Guard IT capabilities 
in support of inter-agency information sharing.  The JCCSE will provide 
communications across a wide spectrum of networks and platforms at the 
incident site in support of the National Guard’s HLS/HLD mission requirements. 
Through JCCSE, the incident commander can access information through FM 
communications, or mobile computing platforms through wireless networks or 
satellite connectivity. This environment ties together disparate information 
sources and can provide a common operating picture to the CNGB, US Northern 
Command (USNORTHCOM) and US Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
commanders, the Governors and other agency heads.  The JCCSE is an 
umbrella term that provides the National Guard’s IT support for the Homeland 
Security / Homeland Defense environment.  JCCSE is not a new network; it is a 




1 – NGB Joint Operations Center (JOC)
2 – NGB J6 Comm Spt Capability
3 – National HLS Comm Capability
4 – JFHQ Comm Spt Capability’
a – State-Level Enterprise Mgt
b – Reaction Force Comm Element
5 – NG CBRNE Enhanced Response
Force Package (NGCERFP)
6 – Netcentric Connectivity































































Figure 12. JCCSE 
 
The foundation of the JCCSE consists of a quick reaction force 
communications element shown in Figure 12, (4b) that is capable of providing 
interoperable wireless communications and reachback to the Joint Force 
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Headquarters, State (JFHQ, State) and beyond. The intent of this element is to 
deploy with National Guard forces in order to provide the required 
communications support at the incident site.   In addition to the quick reaction 
force and under the umbrella of the JCCSE, the National Guard will field a 
National Homeland Security Communications Capability.  This capability is 
designed to deploy in support of an incident and provides those basic 
communications capabilities required under extreme conditions when the local 
ability to provide them has been destroyed. The National Homeland Security 
Communications Capability is described in detail in the section on the National 
Guard’s Civil Support Teams.  In each of the JFHQ, State, a Joint Operations 
Center (JOC) will be fielded in order to provide “situational awareness” (NGB, 
JCCSE Point Paper, 2004, p. 1) so that the Adjutant General of that particular 
state may have a common operating picture that can be relayed to the JOC at 
the National Guard Bureau, to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and to 
the USNORTHCOM and USPACOM commanders. 
As stated earlier, the JCCSE is not envisioned as a new network. JCCSE 
is envisioned as a construct that ties the existing networks together at the 
federal, state and local level in order to leverage the unique role of the National 
Guard in its federal and state missions, providing an integrated picture to the 
agencies operating within the HLS / HLD environment.  This construct simply ties 
together the existing operations centers and information networks so that 
information can flow between them securely and seamlessly.  LTG Blum 
explained in his testimony to Congress that the JCCSE 
…will capitalize on existing NGB computer network connectivity 
throughout the 54 states and territories.  If implemented, such a 
structure could be an important link between the United States 
Northern Command, the United States Pacific Command, the Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 




9.  The National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Center (JOC) 
The National Guard Bureau JOC is where all of the information gathered 
through GuardNet and WarriorNet is aggregated.  It is tied to all 54 JFHQ, State 
JOCs which mirror the NGB JOC, though not at the same level of capability.   
Table 1 depicts the capabilities located at the NGB JOC and contrasts them 
against three JFHQ, State JOCs located in California, Virginia and Maryland.  
Those capabilities listed in Table 1 (Sullivan, 2004b, p. 1) that have blank 
squares are not planned capabilities, whereas those that are red are planned but 
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Table 1.   JOC Capabilities 
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D. THE STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS, STATE 
 
1. Organization 
Recognizing the intent of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) that “Joint 
and combined warfighting is the path to the future” (Blum, 2003, p. 1), LTG Blum 
directed that all State National Guard’s combine the Air and Army National Guard 
headquarters into a single Standing Joint Force Headquarters, State 
(Provisional) no later than 1 October 2003 and directed they become fully 
operational by 1 October 2006. (NGB, JFHQST Transformational Guidance, 
2003, p. 2) As of the writing of this thesis, the transformation of the National 
Guard is ahead of schedule. In his transformational guidance, LTG Blum 
provided templates for how the JFHQ, State may look.  Figure 13 (NGB, Annex D 
JFHQST Transformational Guidance Organization Charts, 2003, p. 2) shows the 
template for the organization.  Of note, within this organization is the inclusion of 
the Naval Reserve, the Coast Guard, the Marine Corps Reserve and the Army 





Coast Guard Naval Reserve US Army Reserve ARNG Units ANG Units Air Force Reserve Marine Corps Res
DIV/Trp Cmd/BDE Wing
 
Figure 13. JFHQ, State organizational template 
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Prior to this change to a Joint Force Headquarters, the Air and Army National 
Guard had their own Headquarters in the States and the staff did not include the 
other reserve forces.  The intent of creating this new Joint organization was to 
consolidate 
…162 separate stovepipe Army and Air National Guard 
headquarters organizations in each state into 54 Joint Force 
Headquarters – creating a single standing joint force headquarters 
in each state for all Army and Air National Guard activities.  (Blum, 
2004, p. 1) 
In his testimony to Congress, LTG Blum makes the case that the National Guard 
and its new Standing JFHQ, State organizational structure is uniquely postured 
to respond to homeland security and homeland defense incidents at all levels of 
government. 
In times of emergency, these standing Joint Force Headquarters 
will provide state Governors with rapid response and better 
integration of National Guard assistance coming from neighboring 
states through existing Emergency Management Assistance 
Compacts.  Additionally, these organizations could provide a 
means for achieving unity of effort by reception and integration of 
any federal forces which the President might employ in an incident. 
These headquarters could also, themselves, be federalized.  
Finally, this headquarters transformation will create efficiencies by 
consolidating the three separate existing headquarters in each 
state under one commander, using the manpower saved to fill 
shortages in lower-echelon units. (Blum, 2004, p. 2) 
 It is important to note that the National Guard of the Several States, as 
illustrated in the beginning of this section, is under the command of the State 
Governor.  This fact will weigh on the final organization of each JFHQ, State and 
it is fully expected that each of the 54 State and Territorial National Guard 
organizations will look and feel different in accordance with their individual 
requirements and in accordance with the Governor’s intent.  
 
2. Civil Support Teams (CST) 
In 1999, Congress funded the creation of the Joint Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Civil Support Teams.  These teams provide support to civilian 
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authorities in the event there is a chemical, biological or radiological incident, to 
include disaster, accident or attack.  On 9-11, the New York CST was first on 
scene in Manhattan testing the air to be sure there were no chemical, biological 
or nuclear materials present.  In the Army Field Manual 3-11.22, the Army 
recognizes the CST as a product of the unique role that the National Guard plays 
at the incident site.  Specifically it states, 
The uniqueness of civil support teams (CSTs) employment and 
support and the enormity of their tasks must be understood; that is, 
the concept that results in employment of national guard (NG) 
CSTs manned by both Army and Air National Guard personnel to 
support local, state (in Title 32 United States Code [USC] status), 
and federal (Title 10 USC status) response systems.  (FM 3-11.22, 
2003, p. 6) 
In this section, the Army refers to the dual nature of the National Guard and how 
the CST specifically can bridge the federal/state gap immediately following an 
incident.  The Governor can, and does, feel very comfortable calling upon the 
National Guard CST as a first response mechanism, as it is an internal asset to 
the state.  At that point, the CST is a Title 32 force.  If and when the incident 
grows to a level that requires federal assistance, the CST can easily transfer to a 
Title 10, federal force, or can stay Title 32 and simply become an interface to the 
federal force.  FM 3-11.22 further reinforces this point in saying that, 
As the “governor’s 911 force for weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD),” the CST provides direct support to the “frontline” of local, 
state, and federal emergency response organizations. CST 
operations will primarily occur in a nonmilitary environment that 
may include urban, rural, industrial, or suburban areas, and/or hot 
or cold weather environments. Additionally, CSTs will operate only 
within the US, DC, Puerto Rico, and US territories or possessions 
while in Title 10 or 32 status. (FM 3-11.22, 2003, p. 6) 
In Figure 14, (FM 3-11.22, 2003, p. 10) the DOD consequence management 
response is illustrated quite well.  What this figure shows is the bridge that the 
CST provides between the federal response and the state response.  FM 3-11.22 
speaks to the nature of this response and makes the point that, 
The line between crisis management and Crisis Management (CM) 
is blurred. CSTs are state assets whose primary mission supports 
CM. They may support the crisis management mission (upon 
request by the appropriate authority) by performing tasks such as 
collecting an evidentiary sample and maintaining the chain of 
custody until it is delivered to applicable personnel; but this is 
secondary to their mission of identifying, assessing, advising, and 
assisting appropriate authorities at an incident site. They generally 
perform their mission at the state level. If an event is of the 
magnitude that the DOD becomes involved, the defense 
coordinating officer (DCO) may call upon a CST for its CM 
capabilities. (FM 3-11.22, 2003, p. 9) 
 
Figure 14. Consequence Management DOD response options 
 
In Figure 14, the horizontal line depicts the border between federal and 
state and is dependent upon the magnitude of the incident.  If the response 
requires consequence management, at the federal level, FEMA would be the 
executive agent.  Consequence Management is made up of operations that deal 
with the consequences after an event, usually a natural disaster.  If, however, the 
response requires crisis management, the FBI would be the executive agent.  
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Crisis Management usually entails a need for law enforcement as it deals with 
the crisis as it happens.  This would occur during a terrorist incident. Below the 
horizontal line all military support to civil authorities would be in Title 32 or state 
active duty and above the line would be federal duty, Title 10. 
FM 3-11.22 states that the mission for the CST is to, 
…support civil authorities at a domestic chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) incident 
site by identifying CBRNE agents/substances, assessing current 
and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and 
assisting with appropriate requests for additional support. (FM 3-
11.22, 2003, p. 6) 
In illustrating how the CST command structure is organized in support of this 
mission, Figure 15 (FM 3-11.22, 2003, p. 21) again depicts the dual nature of the 
National Guard.  The CST answers directly to the State Governor through The 
Adjutant General (TAG), yet has liaison and support roles to both the combat 
commander, USNORTHCOM in CONUS or PACOM in Alaska, Guam and 
Hawaii, and the incident commander.  If required, the CST can be federalized, 
although it is not necessary as it supports all levels of incident response.  
 
Figure 15. CST Command Structure 
 
Within the CST, the team is organized as illustrated in Figure 16. (FM 3-
11.22, 2003, p. 28)  The team is made up of 22 members from both the Army 
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and the Air National Guard. The CST is federally resourced, trained and 
equipped and it is made up of a multi-disciplinary force that contains a variety of 
job specialties. 
 
Figure 16. CST organization 
As shown in Figure 16, the team is made up of a command section, commanded 
by a lieutenant colonel, and five sections.  Of these five, the communications 
section is of particular interest to this thesis, as this section is the proposed 
linkage between the incident commander, their assets in the field and the various 
agencies at the local, state and federal level.  
 The communications section consists of two personnel, a communications 
section chief and an information section officer.  FM 3-11.22 states that the task 
of the communications section is to provide 
…internal and external communications for the unit. The unit 
interconnects with tactical communications at the incident, 
transmits situational reports (SITREPs) to the unit’s HQ, and 
reaches back to obtain technical references and advanced 
modeling. The communications section ensures reliable 
communications to transmit assessments of the CBRNE situation, 
provides reach back for information and subject matter expertise, 
and communicate with higher and supporting HQ. (FM 3-11.22, 
2003, p. 32) 
In support of its mission, the CST is equipped with eight vehicles.  Those 
vehicles include a Unified Command Suite (UCS), a Mobile Analytical Laboratory 
System (MALS), and six other command and logistical vehicles.  The UCS is the 
backbone of the CST’s communication capability and it is designed to bridge and 
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communicate across disparate first response and supporting agency frequencies 
and networks.  FM 3-11.22 states that, 
The Unified Command Suite (UCS) provides a technical support 
interface with robust communications capability across the varied 
first-responder and support agency frequencies to assist the C2. 
Through the UCS, the team can perform reach-back activities to 
other subject matter experts (SMEs) within a number of agencies 
and connect to key modeling capabilities and labs throughout the 
US. This reach-back to technical support provides an additional 
capability for the IC. (FM 3-11.22, 2003, p. 30) 
Table 2 (Sullivan, 2004a, p. 1) depicts the capabilities of the UCS as a mobile 
command post and communications infrastructure that is an essential tool to the 
incident commander.  Supporting the UCS role as an incident response bridge 
between multiple disparate radio and data networks in support of the Incident 
Commander, FM 3-11.22 states that: 
The Unit equipment includes… communications equipment, such 
as the UCS, to provide enhanced architecture and ensure 
communications and data connectivity between federal, state, and 
local response forces. The UCS is a self contained, air-
transportable system that is capable of continuous fixed and mobile 
operations. Its capabilities include high-frequency, ultrahigh-
frequency (UHF), very-high-frequency (VHF), and tactical 
frequency-modulated (FM) satellite communications; secure phone; 
facsimile (FAX) copy; telecomputer; printer; teleconference/video; 
global positioning system (GPS); and an internal and external 
power generation.   (FM 3-11.22, 2003, p. 34) 
Under the direction of the CST commander, the communications section is 
tasked to provide communications support to the incident.  Specifically, the 
communications mission is to “…provide tactical emergency and garrison 
communications to the CST commander and as requested by a site IC.” (FM 3-
11.22, 2003, p. 138)  According to doctrine, the communications section provides 
this support through the UCS which is designed to provide voice and data 
communications across a wide spectrum of networks designed to support civil 
and military agencies.  The UCS is intended to fulfill the role of “common support 
node for an incident site.” (FM 3-11.22, 2003, p. 138)  To fulfill this role, the 
communications section maintains intra-team communications and 
communications with all levels of the incident response as designated by the 
higher headquarters and the incident commander.   
 
Primary Mission: WMD Incident 
Response 
National Guard, Civil Support 
Team Unified Command Suite 
Capability:
 
UHF/VHF/HF Radios Available 
Land Mobile Radios Available 
Ku Band SATCOM Available 
Military UHF SATCOM Available 
INMARSAT Available 
Secure/Non-Secure Voice Available 
Secure/Non-Secure Data Available 
Secure Fax Available 
Secure VTC Programmed 
Wireless LAN Programmed 
DSN/Tactical Telephone Available 
Video feeds Available 
UAV downlink into C2 Under development 
GCCS Interface Available 
C-130 Deployable Available 
Military Power Generator (15KW) Available 
Personnel Requirements 2 Personnel 
 
Table 2.   UCS Capabilities & Comparison 
 
These communications links extend to other supporting agencies and Subject 
Matter Experts (SMEs) in order to provide guidance, logistical support and 
expertise to the incident commander.  The communications section also provides 
classified capable secure communications from the incident site and is 
completely self contained.  The majority of communications from the UCS are 
high frequency radio and satellite based systems and do not require any local 






3. State Networks 
The National Guard Bureau provides GuardNet XXI to all of the 54 states 
and territories including the District of Columbia, but this network terminates at 
the Standing JFHQ, State.  From that point to the individual armories, the states, 
territories and the District are responsible for the design and maintenance of the 
state portion of the Guard’s network.  Through the NGB, the federal government 
assists the states with federal monies, configuration, and security support.  As 
each state National Guard has a unique structure, which is tailored to support the 
Governor, so too is the state network.  Many of the state and territorial National 
Guard networks connect at the Standing JFHQ, State to additional state and 
local agency networks.   
The State of Iowa is an excellent example of how these networks interface 
at the Standing JFHQ, State.  According to the Iowa Fact sheet, the lower level of 
the Standing JFHQ, State houses: 
• the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 
• the Iowa National Guard Emergency Operations Center / JOC 
• the Iowa Department of Public Safety Emergency Operations 
Center and Communications Center  
• the Iowa Communications Network central operations center, and  
• the Disaster Recovery Backup Computer Center. (Iowa Fact Sheet, 
2004, p. 1) 
The State of Iowa has designed the Standing JFHQ, State facility to be an 
alternate site for essential government functions, should anything occur at the 
state capital complex to compromise its capacity to function.  The lower level of 
the facility meets the Federal Emergency Management Agency's requirement for 
states to have provisions for continuity of government, (Iowa Fact Sheet, 2004, p. 
1) and is hardened with concrete and steel I-beams to provide a 24” barrier to 
protect  from  natural  or  man  made  disaster.  According  to  the  fact sheet, the  
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JFHQ, State JOC is directly connected “to a system of 2,800 miles of buried 
cable which represents a highly survivable communications system.” (Iowa Fact 
Sheet, 2004, p. 1)  In addition,  
The Disaster Recovery Computer Center provides a location for the 
state government's seven major computer centers to conduct 
operations if one were to become inoperative. The seven major 
computer centers are located at the three state universities, 
University Hospitals, General Services, Human Services, and the 
Department of Transportation. None have the capacity to back up 
another if one goes down. The backup computer center stores a 
second copy of all computer tapes on which state government runs, 
and is configured to provide all necessary connections to connect 
leased computers in order to bring the computer services back on 
line. (Iowa Fact Sheet, 2004, p. 1)   
The Iowa Standing JFHQ, State is one of the most advanced, interconnected 
organizations in the country, but all of the states, territories and the District of 
Columbia have multiple interfaces with disparate networks at the Standing JFHQ, 
State JOC that can be leveraged to increase the communications footprint that a 




IV. UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND 
On 1 October 2002, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 
was created by President Bush to serve, 
…as a geographic combatant command to provide “unity of 
command” for US military actions that counter threats to our 
homeland from the air, space, land, and sea domains. 
USNORTHCOM is like any other geographic combatant command, 
however the United States homeland is included within the area of 
responsibility (AOR). The total threat picture to the AOR 
encompasses state symmetric (state on state), state asymmetric 
(e.g., information warfare), and non-state asymmetric (e.g., 
terrorism). (United States Northern Command, 2004, p. 15)  
Within the United States Department of Defense, the globe is assigned to five 
combatant commands, USNORTHCOM, United States European Command 
(USEUCOM), United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States 
Southern Command (USSOCOM) and United States Central Command 
(USCENTCOM).  These assigned areas are called Areas of Responsibility 
(AORs) and the four surrounding North America are depicted in Figure 17. 
(United States Northern Command, 2004, p. 30)  USNORTHCOM is the 
Department of Defense’s lead agency in the protection of the continental United 
States territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure against military 
attacks emanating from outside the country.   An attack of this type is considered 
to be an act of war, and as such, USNORTHCOM’s mission is defense of the 
homeland or “homeland defense”.  As a military organization, USNORTHCOM’s 
actions within the United States are governed by law under the Posse Comitatus 
Act, as mentioned earlier.  This act prohibits direct military involvement in 
domestic law enforcement activities and restricts the military’s activities to 
homeland defense and civil support to lead “civilian” federal agencies.  
 
 
Figure 17. Combatant Commands AORs that adjoin the United States 
 
General Eberhart, the commander of USNORTHCOM, expressed the role 
of USNORTHCOM well in his testimony to Congress.  He said: 
We conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and 
aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests. 
We also provide military assistance to civil authorities, when 
directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). 
When we work with civil authorities, we will most likely be in a 
support role to a lead federal agency, providing a single point of 
contact for federal military assistance. The President’s decision to 
establish USNORTHCOM has enhanced the Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) ability to provide quick, responsive support, when 
and where needed. (Eberhart, 2003, p. 1) 
USNORTHCOM recognizes the uniqueness of the National Guard and how the 
duality of mission, as discussed earlier, makes the Guard the likely first 
responder for the military at the incident site.  The USNORTHCOM Concept of 
Operations makes the point that: 
Given the unique operations environment of the AOR, the reserve 
components, by virtue of their community-based presence, are in a 
unique position as de facto forward military capabilities throughout 
the 54 States/Territories. Additionally, the National Guard’s [NG] 
unique dual State-Federal status makes it likely that the National 
Guard will be employed in State Active Duty [SAD] or Title 32 
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[when appropriately authorized] status as soon as the governor[s] 
determines that a military capability is needed to augment civilian 
emergency response capabilities. Consequently, in virtually all civil 
support like situations, the National Guard is likely to be the first 
military organization engaged at the state-level as well as at the 
incident area - the “first line of military response.” The National 
Guard can also be leveraged to provide early situational and status 
information to USNORTHCOM and other Federal stakeholders as 
the “first line of situational awareness.” (United States Northern 
Command, 2004, p. 28) 
 
A. ORGANIZATION 
 The Organization chart for USNORTHCOM is depicted in Figure 18.  
USNORTHCOM’s headquarters is located in Colorado Springs, Colorado at the 
Peterson Air force Base.  In order to accomplish its missions, USNORTHCOM 
utilizes a combination of Joint forces.  Joint Task Force – Civil Support, JTF-CS 
and Joint Task Force – 6, JTF-6 are the two primary task forces that 
USNORTHCOM relies upon to complete its mission.  The USNORTHCOM 
Concept of operations lays out the roles of both JTF-CS and JTF-6.  It states with 
regards to JTF-CS that, 
JTF-CS plans and integrates DoD support to the designated Lead 
Federal Agency for CBRNE CM” (consequence management) 
“operations. When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, JTF-CS will 
deploy to the incident site, establish command and control of 
designated DoD forces and provide military assistance to civil 
authorities to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary 
critical life support. (United States Northern Command, 2004, p. 42) 
With regards to JTF-6, the concept of operations states,   
JTF-6 synchronizes and integrates DoD operational, training, and 
intelligence support to domestic law enforcement agency 
counterdrug efforts in the CONUS to reduce the availability of illegal 
drugs in the United States; and, when directed, provides 
operational, training, and intelligence support to domestic agency 
efforts in combating terrorism. (United States Northern Command, 
2004, p. 44) 
The missions assigned to both JTF-CS and JTF-6 are very closely related to 
those of the National Guard, and in fact the JTF’s and the National Guard 
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conduct Joint exercises on a regular basis and coordinate their efforts in 
everyday operations throughout the United States.  JTF-CS and JTF-6 are made 
up of components from the Army, ARNORTH, the Air Force, AFNORTH, the 
Marine Corps, MARFORNORTH and the Navy, NAVNORTH but are under the 
operational control of USNORTHCOM.  Three interesting relationships are 
depicted in Figure 18.  (United States Northern Command, 2004, p. 39)  
USNORTHCOM has a coordinating relationship with three force providers that 
they may draw upon should the need arise.  These are NORAD, NGB and the 
Coast Guard.  The USNORTHCOM concept of operations addresses this 
relationship with NGB; specifically, it states, 
The National Guard Bureau is DoD’s official channel of 
communications on all matters pertaining to the Army National 
Guard and Air National Guard. As such, USNORTHCOM will foster 
close and continuous coordination with the NGB and leverage the 
NGB’s capability to facilitate situational awareness, planning, and 
execution of military support within the States/Territories. (United 
States Northern Command, 2004, p. 44) 
 In order to support this relationship, it is essential that there be a continuous 
presence within the coordinating agencies supporting USNORTHCOM, and that 
this be supported by IT so that any response to an incident site is a coordinated 
one.   
 
 
Figure 18. NORTHCOM Organizational Chart 
 
B. MISSION 
 The mission of USNORTHCOM is stated as, 
USNORTHCOM conducts operations to deter, prevent, and defeat 
threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, 
and interests within the assigned AOR. As directed by the 
President of the United States (POTUS) or Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF), USNORTHCOM provides military assistance to civil 
authorities, including consequence management operations. 
(United States Northern Command, 2004, p. 27) 
USNORTHCOM performs its mission with a graduated response much in the 
way that the local response is graduated.  As the situation becomes more 
complex and requires greater response, USNORTHCOM can bring more assets 
to the table.  This response is shown in Figure 19.  Figure 19 shows that as the 
event magnitude increases, the response increases.  This response begins with 
providing information at the state level and potential operations such as 
firefighting and civil disturbance support and gradually increases through 
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Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Events (CBRNE) support to full 
military intervention in time of invasion or war.  It should be noted that the 
National Guard is the military’s first responder and this role is again depicted in 




Figure 19. USNORTHCOM Graduated Response 
 
C. THE DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS NETWORK (DISN) 
 USNORTHCOM currently utilizes the DISN for connectivity between itself 
and other DoD entities.  DISN is currently made up of secure IP and ATM data 
communications services, hosts both classified and unclassified networks, and is 
administered by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).   
The unclassified but sensitive IP Router Network (NIPRNet) provides 
interoperable communications for all combat support activities within 
USNORTHCOM and it provides access to the Internet.  This Internet connection 
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is also utilized by the National Guard as GuardNet XXI is tied into the NIPRNet.  
Direct connection data rates on the NIPRNet range from 56Kbps to 155Mbps 
depending upon the type of connection and the requirements of the organization. 
(DISN Information Sheet, 2004, p. 1) 
The DISN also provides secure classified communications through the 
Secret IP Router Network (SIPRNet).  According to the DISN information sheet 
SIPRNet is, 
DoD’s largest interoperable command and control data network, 
supporting the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), the 
Defense Message System (DMS), collaborative planning and 
numerous other classified warfighter applications. Direct connection 
data rates range from 56 kbps to 155 Mbps for the NIPRNet, and 
up to 45 Mbps for the SIPRNet. Remote dial-up services are also 
available, ranging from 19.2 kbps on SIPRNet to 56 kbps on 
NIPRNet. (DISN Information Sheet, 2004, p. 1) 
Currently, in addition to connectivity to all major installations, SIPRNet is 
connected directly to all 54 JFHQ, State headquarters for classified information 
flow.  Through connection to DISN, JCCSE can provide the linkage to 
NORTHCOM directly and to Department of Homeland Security through the 
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V. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has as its mission to protect 
the United States against terrorist attacks.  To do this, the component agencies 
within DHS collect and analyze threats and intelligence, guard the borders of the 
United States and protect its critical infrastructure. In the event of an emergency, 
DHS has as its role, the coordination of the national response.  These missions 
necessitate that DHS be able to communicate across all levels of government 
from the federal level to the state and local level including the civilian sector.  
Additionally, component agencies within DHS have as their responsibility the 
training for, and implementation of, a coordinated response to a national 
emergency across all levels of government and the civilian sector.  Germane to 
this thesis are the initiatives that DHS has undertaken in order to bring together 
the disparate organizations and agencies that it serves to share information and 
to create a unity of effort for incident response.  In its August 2003 report, the 
GAO noted that: 
Recognizing that information sharing to fight terrorism is a key 
factor in homeland security, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security has a number of initiatives under way to enhance 
information-sharing, including the development of a homeland 
security blueprint, referred to as an enterprise architecture. Through 
this architecture, DHS plans to integrate the sharing of information 
within the federal government and between federal agencies, state 
and city governments, and the private sector. (GAO Report, 
Homeland Security, Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to 
be Strengthened, 2003, p. 8) 
 
B. ORGANIZATION 
The Department of Homeland Security is made up of five major 
directorates.  These directorates, as shown in Figure 20, (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2004a, p. 1) are:  
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1. Border and Transportation Security: This directorate is responsible 
for securing the United States border’s and transportation systems. 
2. Emergency Preparedness and Response: This directorate is 
responsible for ensuring that the United States is prepared for and 
able to recover from both terrorist attacks and natural disasters 
such as floods, hurricanes and tornadoes. 
3. Science and Technology:  This directorate is responsible for 
coordinating the agencies’ research and development.  A priority of 
work within the Science and Technology division is research and 
development of products and systems utilized in response to a 
weapon of mass destruction. 
4. Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection:  This directorate 
is responsible for intelligence fusion concerning threats to the 
United States homeland, the issuance of timely warnings to other 
federal, state and local agencies and preventive or protective action 
where necessary.   
5. Management:  This directorate is responsible for managing the 














Figure 20. Department of Homeland Security Organizational Chart 
 
In addition to the five main directorates, the Department of Homeland Security 
also has within it six additional agencies that have either been consolidated 
under the department or are being created. (Department of Homeland Security 
Organization, 2004, p. 1) 
1. United States Coast Guard: The Commandant of the Coast Guard 
reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security and upon 
declaration of war, the Coast Guard falls under the command of the 
Department of Defense. 
2. United States Secret Service:  The Secret Service has two 
missions.  First, protection of the President and governmental 
officials and second, protection of U.S. currency from counterfeiting 
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3. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services: The bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigrations Services is responsible for providing 
efficient immigration services and helping to assist incoming 
immigrants in the transition to American citizenship. 
4. Office of State and Local Coordination:  The Office of State and 
Local Coordination is responsible for ensuring close coordination 
between the federal, state and local responders and their 
respective governments. 
5. Office of Private Sector Liaison:  The Office of Private Sector 
Liaison provides a direct channel of communication between the 
businesses of the United States and the Department. 
6. Office of the Inspector General:  The Office of the Inspector 
General provides DHS with an internal watchdog to safeguard 
against fraud, abuse and mismanagement. 
 
C. JOINT REGIONAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE SYSTEM 
The Joint Information Exchange System (JRIES) is a system that DHS is 
fielding in an attempt to utilize IT to focus more power on combating terrorism 
through information sharing and intelligence gathering by thousands of local law 
enforcement personnel.  Currently this system is in its initial phases and as of 
September 2003, there were 14 states participating in JRIES.  JRIES coverage 
and participation is shown in Figure 21. (Department of Homeland Security, 










Figure 21. JRIES Participation 
 
According to the DHS JRIES Briefing given to the National Guard, DHS is 
planning an eventual expansion to all 50 States, and the six Territories and 
Protectorates.  In addition, JRIES will connect to 76 major cities and all 3033 
counties across America.  According to the brief, specific connectivity planned in 
those locations includes connections to: 
• National Guard: EOC, J-2, Homeland Defense section (connected 
into JCCSE) 
• State Police 
 Eastern Region 
Near Future 
Portland PD 
Utah State Police Intel Division 
Military District of Washington 
DCSOPS  
  Force Protection Division 




State and Local 
Organizations 
Federal Agencies 
Department of Homeland Security 
Legend Houston Police Department 
Intel Division 
US Capitol Police Intel Division 
US Coast Guard  Regional Server California Anti-Terrorism 
Information Center 
US Park Police JRIES US Secret Service Kansas City Missouri Police Staten Island NY Department Intel Division Transportation Security 
Administration Los Angeles County Sheriffs US Customs and Border Protection Office Intel Division 
State and Local Organizations Los Angeles Police Bristol County, MA Sheriffs  Las Vegas PD Intel Division   Department  Intel Division Department Intel Division Chicago P D Intel Division Louisiana State Police Fairfax County, VA Police 
Department 
Intel Division 
Orange County, CA Sheriffs Florida Department of Law  Department Intel Division 
  Enforcement Intel Division Seattle Police Department Maryland State Police Intel Division Massachusetts Port Authority Police Texas Department of New Jersey State Police Counter Public Safety Intel Division 
  Terrorism Division Department of Defense 
New York Police Department U.S. Northern Command 
  Counter Terrorism Division  
New York State Police Intel Division 
Port Authority NY/NJ Intel Division 
Suffolk County, NY Police Dept. 
* As of September Washington D.C. Metro Police 
Department of Defense 
Counter Intelligence Field Activity 
Defense Intelligence Agency JITF-CT
US Transportation Command 
Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
  Maritime Threat Analysis Center 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
National Guard Bureau 
• State’s Homeland Security Advisors 
• State’s Emergency Operations Centers 
Future enhancements to JRIES will incorporate remaining federal partners and 
will integrate with other SBU/FOUO (For Official Use Only) networks. 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2003, p. 7)  As of the writing of this thesis, 
JRIES has been accepted by USNORTHCOM and NGB and has been installed 
in the USNORTHCOM JOC and the NGB JOC.   
Figure 22 (Department of Homeland Security, 2003, p. 13) depicts the 
DHS integrated architecture that JRIES will reside upon. 
 
 
Figure 22. DHS Integrated Architecture 
 
This depiction shows that the DHS operations center is the center of DHS’s 
information/intelligence analysis efforts, but those efforts rely upon a foundation 
of information and a common operating picture provided to the operations center 
through interface with many disparate agencies.  The National Guard CST team 
through interface with the NGB JOC and JCCSE can provide that information 
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linkage to the incident site and assist in aggregating information from the state 
and local level for transport to the DHS operations center and JRIES. 
 
D. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK (HSIN) 
In an effort to: 
…strengthen its real time collaborative flow of threat information to 
state and local communities  (HSIN Fact Sheet, 2004, p. 1) 
the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate has fielded a 
commercial off the shelf Internet based counterterrorism collaborative network 
based upon the Groove Inc. collaborative workspace.  HSIN, in its current form, 
provides secure real time information sharing at the State and local level at the 
Sensitive but Unclassified Level.  The HSIN Fact Sheet states that, 
Future program expansion will include the county level, 
communication at the classified SECRET level, and the 
involvement of the private sector. (HSIN Fact Sheet, 2004, p. 1) 
The HSIN is designed to interface with the DHS Homeland Security Operations 
Center (HSOC) utilizing the Joint Regional Information Exchange System, which 
was discussed in the previous section, and with the NORTHCOM and NGB Joint 
Operation Centers (JOCs), in order to pass information as required.  It is 
envisioned that through the HSIN, DHS will be able to collaborate real time with 
each state and major urban area's participants including: 
…governors, mayors, Homeland Security Advisor, state National 
Guard offices, Emergency Operations Centers, First Responder 
and Public Safety departments, and other key homeland security 
partners. (HSIN Fact Sheet, 2004, p. 1)  
In order to better understand what HSIN offers, the DHS breaks its functionality 
into three areas, unique capabilities, collaboration/analysis and information.  The 
HSIN Fact Sheet lists these functions as: 
1. Unique Capabilities  
• Communications 
• Low-cost, 24/7 connectivity 
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• End-to-end encrypted communications 
2. Collaboration/Analysis 
• Secure email 
• Interactive collaborative tool (real-time, text or voice) 
• Supports requests for information, exchange, and cross reference 
• Search and Link/Timeline analysis, map/imagery displays  
3. Information 
• Daily, periodic, and ongoing report sharing 
• Suspicious incident/pre-incident indicator data 
• Media studies and analysis 
• Mapping and imaging (national, state, county, city) 
• Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) information 
• Strategic analysis of terrorist threats, tactics and weapons 
(HSIN Fact Sheet, 2004, p. 1) 
  
E. SAFECOM 
The Wireless Public SAFEty Interoperable COMmunications (SAFECOM) 
program, under the Department of Homeland Security, is exploring solutions and 
standards for the public safety interoperable communications within the incident 
area, and is an umbrella program that encompasses various public safety 
wireless initiatives and involves wide-ranging activities.  SAFECOM has as its 
goal, to ensure that all first responders can communicate with each other.   
Recognizing that it will be many years before they will all have compatible 
devices, SAFECOM in the short term, is focusing on hardware that will allow 
disparate communication devices to interface with each other.  In a DHS 
response to the April 2004 GAO report on SAFECOM, DHS explains: 
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The SAFECOM program works with existing federal communication 
initiatives and key public safety stakeholders to coordinate the 
development of better technologies and create processes to 
support the cross-jurisdictional and cross-disciplinary coordination 
of existing systems and future networks.  SAFECOM was 
established as the umbrella program within the federal government 
to help local, tribal, state and federal public safety agencies 
improve public safety response through more effective and efficient 
interoperable wireless communications, which SAFECOM defines 
as the ability of public safety agencies to talk across disciplines and 
jurisdictions via radio communications systems, exchanging voice 
and/or data with one another on demand, in real time, when 
needed and authorized. (GAO Report, Project SAFECOM, 2004, p. 
18) 
SAFECOM was initially started under the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) e-government initiative with the managing partner for the program being 
the Department of Treasury.  In May of 2002, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) was assigned the role of managing partner and the 
managing partner was again changed in May of 2003 as DHS took up the role. 
(GAO Report, Project SAFECOM, 2004, p. 11)   According to the April 2004 GAO 
report:  
This lack of sustained, committed executive leadership hampered 
SAFECOM’s ability to produce results tied to its overall objective. 
(GAO Report, Project SAFECOM, 2004, p. 11)     
Since taking on the role as managing partner in May of 2003, DHS has 
committed to the SAFECOM program.  Though SAFECOM has been slow to 
evolve, the need to bridge disparate networks has not slackened and DHS has 
expressed that it will continue to pursue this program.  The April 2004 GAO 
Report recommended that:   
…the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary 
for Science and Technology to complete written agreements with 
the project’s identified stakeholders, including federal agencies and 
organizations representing state and local governments. These 
agreements should define the responsibilities and resource 
commitments that each of those organizations will assume and 
include specific provisions that measure program performance. 
(GAO Report, Project SAFECOM, 2004, p. 16)    
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The National Guard Bureau J6 is a committed federal partner with the 
SAFECOM program and is an active participant.  Currently, the National Guard is 
participates in the Rapid Emergency-level Interim Communications 
Interoperability (RELICI) project (now referred to as “Rapid Comm 9/30”), is a 
participant on the SAFECOM advisory committee and actively participates in the 
Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications (FPIC), a sub committee 
of SAFECOM for federal entities. 
 
F. PRE-POSITIONED EQUIPMENT PACKAGES 
Through a cooperative effort with the Department of Justice, Department 
of State, Office of Domestic Support, U.S. Department of Justice (ODS) and the 
Marine Corps Command, the Department of Homeland Security, Office of 
Domestic Preparedness (ODP) has established 11 Pre-positioned Equipment 
Packages (PEP).  PEP will contain identical equipment so as to standardize 
maintenance and training.  These packages are intended to replenish up to 150 
fire fighters, law enforcement, medical teams and urban search and rescue 
organizations.  According to a DHS briefing on PEP, the mission of the PEP 
program is to: 
Procure, kit, ship, store, maintain, deploy, and replenish Ten or 
more Pre-positioned Equipment Packages Configured to 
reconstitute emergency response Organizations during the 12-24 
hour period following a Terrorist attack using Nuclear, Biological, 
Chemical, Radiological, or Conventional High Yield Explosive 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.  (Office of Domestic Preparedness, 
2004a, p. 3) 
According to the briefing presented in April of 2004 (Office of Domestic 
Preparedness, 2004a, p. 4), these packages consist of: 
• Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Detectors 
• Personal Protective Equipment 
• Decontamination Equipment 
• Communications Equipment 
61 
• Bunker Gear 
• Urban Search and Rescue - Technical Search Equipment 
• Medical Equipment, prophylaxis, and medications 
• Transportation, packaging, and material handling equipment 
Notably in the PEP, ODP has included a number of pieces of 
communications equipment.  It is recognized by the PEP working group that, 
Experience at prior major incident sites revealed serious obstacles to inter 
agency communications; thus the PEP Working Group deemed 
interoperable communications crucial. A complete field mobile 
communications system will be transported to the scene to enhance the 
availability of first responders to have interoperable radio and data 
communications at the scene. (Office of Domestic Preparedness, 2004b, 
p. 1) 
 
An in depth look at the PEP communications equipment list major end 
items results in the following: (Office of Domestic Preparedness, 2004b, p. 2): 
• Individual communications components: 
o 50 Level A in-suit communication links 
o 4 sets of 50 field programmable portable radios in separate 
spectrum: 148-174 MHz; 403-457 MHz; 450-512 MHz; and 
800 MHz including battery packs, and Yagi and co-linear 
antennas that span portions of their respective frequency 
spreads  
o Sixty speaker microphones  
• Four laptop computers—two for logistics and two for programming 
• Two satellite phones   
• 4 cellular telephones 
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• 5000-watt generator and an uninterruptible power supply 
For execution of the PEP project, ODS is the executive agent and 
develops the protocols for deployment of the PEP equipment.  Marine Corps 
Systems Command (MARFORSYSCOM) manages the acquisition of the 
equipment and is funded through the ODS equipment grants.  
MARFORSYSCOM is additionally responsible for outsourcing all maintenance 
and training for the PEP and is tasked with replenishment as required.  ODP is 
responsible to alert MARFORSYSCOM in the case of expected or imminent 
incident and to deploy the equipment should a need arise.  In addition, ODP 
provides accountability for equipment on site and is responsible for loaning 
equipment to other agencies if required.  Two issues that have yet to be resolved 
are who operates the equipment once it is deployed, since local first responders 
are not trained to operate it, and who coordinates the required airlift in order to 
move the PEP equipment so that the allocation is made before a terrorist event.   
The PEP when deployed must be accessible at the incident site in a timely 
manner and must sustain the first response community for up to 24 hours.  This 
has led to the requirement that all PEP must be located within one hour of a 
commercial or military airfield and must have easy access to major thoroughfares 
and rail.  The geographic location of the PEP equipment is depicted in Figure 23. 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2004b, p. 1)   
 
Figure 23. PEP Locations 
 
Each of the PEP sites will be pre-packaged in pods that are transportable 
and accessible.  The PEP is an essential piece of the puzzle that will have to 
assist in bridging the incident response digital divide as it will become a portion of 
the communications infrastructure that responds to a major terrorist incident.  It is 
critical that this system interoperate with existing systems, the National Guard 
UCS and the JCCSE in order to compliment existing infrastructure and 
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VI. PILOT AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECT CASE STUDIES 
In this section, I will describe four pilot and demonstration projects in order 
to show the type of efforts underway across the United States in support of 
bridging the incident response digital divide.  This section is not intended to be an 
exhaustive listing as there have been dozens of initiatives funded that attempt to 
solve one or more pieces of the puzzle that makes up this problem. 
 
A. NATIONAL EMERGENCY AND DISASTER INFORMATION SYSTEM 
(NEDIS) 
 The NEDIS pilot project is intended to interface with the NGB JCCSE 
infrastructure in order to provide a database of information that will be available 
to the first responder at the incident site.  The NGB J3 NEDIS briefing states that: 
National Emergency and Disaster Information System (NEDIS) is a 
World Wide Web accessible database of organizations, skills and 
expertise, emergency equipment, best practices, lessons learned, 
and mapping data.  NEDIS provides a capability for the collection, 
analysis and dissemination of information and expertise critical to 
the coordination of responses as the first military responder to a 
terrorist attack upon domestic soil. (NGB, NGB J3 NEDIS Brief, 
2004, p. 16) 
NEDIS was funded through a congressional action and is envisioned to be 
fielded in three major phases.  Those phases are: 
1. Proof of Concept (Completed in 2002) 
2. System Development and initial implementation (Current) 
3. Full implementation 
Figure 24 (NGB, NGB J3 NEDIS Brief, 2004, p. 13) shows the interface 
that is envisioned between NEDIS and JCCSE as NEDIS becomes an 








































Figure 24. NEDIS Relationship to JCCSE 
 
NEDIS is considered an Incident “Diagnosis and Treatment” System.  It 
will consist of two levels, the enterprise level and the incident level.  In terms of 
hardware, NEDIS will be made up of a data repository and a number of hand 
held devices.  The NEDIS Concept of Operations calls for six progressive and 
building scenarios that will add capability and complexity to the system.  The first 
scenario is a “routine incident where no additional resources are required.” (NGB, 
NGB J3 NEDIS Brief, 2004, p. 8)  In this scenario, there will be a single NEDIS 
device and it will not need to interface or communicate outside of the incident 
site.  It is anticipated that this scenario covers up to 80% of incidents that first 
responders will encounter.  In the second scenario there is a “routine incident 
where communications are available.” (NGB, NGB J3 NEDIS Brief, 2004, p. 8)  
In this scenario, there will be added communications back to the 911 center and 
the EOC.  In scenario three there will be an “incident where multiple NEDIS 
devices are available.” (NGB, NGB J3 NEDIS Brief, 2004, p. 8)  In this scenario, 
the NEDIS database will break the single incident checklist that the first 
responders utilize into sub checklists and will add the enhanced capability for 
67 
intra-site communications.  In scenario four, there will be an “incident where 
additional resources/support are required.” (NGB, NGB J3 NEDIS Brief, 2004, p. 
8)  This scenario is anticipated to account for the other 20% of incidents that first 
responders encounter and will require interaction with the EOC to coordinate the 
requests for additional support and resources.  Scenario five will be an “incident 
where outside input is required – e.g. Subject Matter Expert input.” (NGB, NGB 
J3 NEDIS Brief, 2004, p. 8)  This scenario will require the external experts to 
input data into the NEDIS database and this data must be searchable and 
available at the incident site to the first responders.  In the final and sixth 
scenario, there will be “an incident where outside access is requested/required.” 
(NGB, NGB J3 NEDIS Brief, 2004, p. 8)  In this scenario, external entities will 
receive output from the NEDIS database in order to enhance situational 
awareness and assist in formulating a common operating picture.  It is 
envisioned that at this point, NEDIS will interface with JCCSE in order to receive 
data from experts and to push data into the Standing JFHQ, State JOC and the 
NGB JOC.  This data would then be available to USNORTHCOM, USPACOM 
and DHS. 
 
B. EXTENDED RANGE WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORK (WLAN) 
The typical extended range WLAN consists of a transmitting entity and 
multiple wireless access points.  With today’s technology, many of us have 
access to the Internet via wireless either through 802.11b or 802.11g, but these 
are relatively short range and are line of sight.  Northrop Grumman Inc. has 
designed one solution to extending the reach of the WLAN to the incident site.  
With their design, they extend the Wide Area Network (WAN) that is terminated 
at a public building by providing connectivity to the fiber that terminates in that 
facility to a wireless access point.  The responding vehicles would be equipped 
with an extended range, amplified wireless system that would allow connectivity 
between the mobile computing platform and the access point located strategically 
at one of the public buildings or at a cell tower.  Figure 25 (Northrop Grumman, 
2004, p. 6) depicts WLAN connectivity to the response site. 
Figure 25. Extended WLAN 
 
According to Northrop Grumman’s white paper: 
The main purpose for this high-speed mobile WLAN is to allow for 
the transfer of administrative non-urgent data traffic and other types 
of large data file transfers (such as records management files, 
photos or video, field reports, surface map updates, crime reports, 
etc.) to be rapidly transmitted and/or received between the vehicle 
MDC and the agency headquarters (i.e., police, fire, or other 
County agency). This frees the agency's currently employed data 
communication system to focus solely on supporting the more 
critical (low data rate) data and/or voice communications such as 
dispatch and AVL communications. (Northrop Grumman, 2004, p. 
5) 
As depicted in Figure 25, this system would allow the first responder to access 
information at the incident on a Personal Data Assistant (PDA) via wireless 
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802.11b through the mobile access point, their vehicle or command vehicle, 
which is tied to the main WAN and their agency’s LAN through an extended 
range WLAN and fiber.  This would allow for information flow from the EOC to the 
incident and back.  This type of system is one of the enablers that would allow for 
a common operating picture to flow between the incident, the EOC, the standing 
JFHQ State JOC, NGB JOC, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM and DHS. 
 
C. EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEM INTERFACE NOTIFIER 
The Emergency Response System Interface Notifier is a Windows 
Desktop system that was constructed utilizing GIS satellite mapping images and 
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software from Microsoft Inc.  This system was 
constructed for the county of Fairfax, Virginia in order to demonstrate the value 
and ease of importing GIS data into an application in support of first responders.  
When designed, Notifier was demonstrated for the Fairfax-Falls Church 
Community Service Board (CSB).  The CSB is responsible for: 
…the provision of quality mental health, mental retardation, alcohol 
and drug, and early intervention services to more than 20,000 
people a year.  Services are provided in more than 16 outpatient 
clinics and 350 residential sites throughout Fairfax County and the 
Cities of Fairfax and Falls Church, Virginia. (Dennis, 2004, p. 1) 
Federal Law and State laws mandate how the CSB must interact with the first 
responder community in order to evacuate its special needs patients in the event 
of natural disaster or terrorist attack.  The Notifier system utilizes a secure 
connection to the CSB database in order to plot the physical location of those 
patients within the county.  Utilizing this data and a plot of the incident area, CSB 
is given a picture of who needs evacuation and their location, as depicted in 
Figure 26.  (Dennis, 2004, p. 2) 
 Figure 26. An incident plot with patient’s locations  
 
In addition to depicting those needing care, Notifier has embedded in it a phone 
tree system that will allow for the CSB to easily contact the first responders of 
those needing special care and of their location.  This system allows for zooming 
into the area and high resolution photographic images to be displayed for a better 
picture of the situation for the responder.  This system is designed to be run from 
a laptop at either the incident site or, more likely, as a station at the state or 
county EOC.  ESRI Notifier is an example of the type of information that is 
gathered that can be utilized to create situational awareness.  This system is one 
of many that would require integration into the common operating picture that is 
fused at the EOC and ported through JCCSE. 
 
D. AUTOMATED EXERCISE AND ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (AEAS) 
The AEAS is a system designed and fielded by the National Guard that is 
designed to exercise and assess emergency response procedures at the 
jurisdictional level from the local municipality up to the State.  According to the 
AEAS fact sheet:  
AEAS supports common terminology, standardized ascendancy, 
integrated communications, unified command structure, 
consolidated action plans, designated incident facilities (command 
post, staging area, etc.), manageable span-of-control, and com-
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prehensive resource management based on the Incident Command 
System (ICS) and supplemented by mutual aid compacts and 
protocols that accommodate regional and state-level participation. 
(NGB, AEAS Fact Sheet, 2003, p. 1) 
AEAS, as designed and fielded by the National Guard Bureau, is available free of 
charge to local emergency response communities as a tool to exercise their 
response to a WMD incident.  It is designed to allow emergency response 
agencies to exercise their response to an incident in a simulated environment 
and discover strengths, weaknesses and interoperability shortfalls such as radio 
frequencies, manpower issues, communications procedures, etc.  In its current 
form, AEAS simply exercises emergency response agencies within a state and 
how those agencies interact with some of the federal agencies, but by utilizing 
this system, the potential exists to connect this simulation through JCCSE to the 
standing JFHQ, State JOC, the NGB JOC, the USNORTHCOM and USPACOM 
JOC and DHS HSOC in order to prove connectivity and to exercise the national 
response to an incident. 
 




As shown above in Figure 27, (NGB, AEAS Promotional Brief, 2003, p. 8) 
AEAS is a PC based simulation that allows for real time collaboration between up 
to 20 participants through a LAN and can be set up to run within one room or 
between rooms, depending upon how the local jurisdiction normally operates.  
The AEAS provides each participant with scenario information and provides 
situational message traffic, according to the role that participant is playing. The 
AEAS scenario map details the incident and the response, as well as the 
community’s assets and how the environment changes with time within the 
scenario and according to the participant’s response.  Each participant’s actions 
are recorded and continuous feedback is provided throughout the exercise and 
following the exercise in a detailed After Action Review (AAR).  This AAR 
provides a detailed event log and compares reactions by the participants to 
national standards to determine areas of needed improvement.  AEAS has three 
specific phases, pre-exercise, exercise and post exercise.   
In the pre-exercise, the local jurisdiction is able to build out the scenario 
with real time information specific to the assets available in their jurisdiction and 
plot that information against either a provided map or against a map developed 
from satellite imagery.  This data consists of information such as police, 
firefighting and medical assets and their locations to include equipment types.  
Once completed, this phase provides a fairly accurate depiction of what the 
response communities have to work with in a disaster.  During this phase, the 
role players are selected from their areas of responsibility within the response to 
include all levels up to and including the National Guard liaison.  Some examples 
of the positions would be that of incident commander, administration, law 
enforcement, public affairs, chaplaincy, HAZMAT, medical support and military 
support.  There are 37 possible roles that could be played in the next phase. 
In the exercise phase, the participants are faced with one of the following 
scenarios: 
1. Anti abortion, domestic anthrax hoax 
2. Anti-government, domestic anthrax contamination 
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3. Retribution, foreign group radiological 
4. Domestic group sarin, public outdoor 
5. White supremacist domestic, phosgene/propane derailment 
6. Disgruntled individuals, foot and mouth several farms 
7. Retribution, foreign group conventional explosive 
8. Retribution, foreign group radiological, outdoor event 
9. Retribution, foreign group, anthrax line source 
10. Military diversion, state sponsored smallpox 
11. Retribution, foreign group radiological, downtown 
According to a tri-fold informational packet distributed with AEAS, the exercise 
phase is: 
…based on a comprehensive set of Tasks, Conditions and 
Standards that have been identified by stakeholder response 
agencies from across the nation. AEAS presents events and 
information on the course of the incident; receives real time input 
from the exercise participants, reflecting their decisions and 
actions; determines the results and consequences of those 
decisions and actions and presents the next step in the course of 
events based on those results and consequences. The flow of 
incident command ascendancy is automatically incorporated into 
the exercise. The system tracks players’ responses and provides a 
real time assessment of their expected actions. (NGB, AEAS tri-
fold, 2003, p. 1) 
 The final phase in AEAS is the post exercise phase.  During this phase, 
the information collected in the exercise phase is provided in the form of general 
feedback on the status of the incident and the adequacy of the response.  A diary 
of events shows the response of all participants as well as the consequences of 
those responses, to include linkages to other actions.  Finally, the post exercise 
AAR provides an overview of how well the participants performed measured 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Within the United States, incident response is a tiered system.  Initial 
response is a local responsibility as local first responders, fire, police and medical 
professionals react to an event and provide assistance and analysis.  This would 
be considered tier one as depicted in Figure 31.  If the incident exceeds the 
capabilities of the local first response community, they enact mutual aid 
agreements in order to secure assistance from bordering municipalities and the 
state.  The state’s response at an incident is under the direct control of the 
Governor and as shown in Figure 28, (FM 3.11-22, 2003, p. 38) is tier two of the 
incident response.  In the most serious of events, the federal government will 
become involved, to include the FBI and the Combatant Commander (COCOM).   
 
Figure 28. Tiered Response 
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Tier three, the third and final tier requires the most coordination of effort in order 
to maximize the effectiveness of the response and is governed by the Federal 
Response Plan (FRP).  As shown, the CST is an asset the Governor can and will 
employ at tier one. Through the unique structure and mission of the National 
Guard, the CST can then continue to operate if required at tier two and finally at 
tier three.  
 Today, within the United States homeland, there exists a divide between 
what a local municipality can do for itself and what they entrust to government 
agencies.  Most Americans are at least a little discomforted to see a response 
required by the federal component of our Armed forces.  These forces have 
developed into units that are utilized elsewhere within the world to secure the 
United States and its interests.  Conversely, it is common for a Governor to call 
out their National Guard in response to a local disaster or emergency.  The 
community is familiar with the National Guard. It is made up of local citizens who 
live and work in the community.  This unique role gives the National Guard a 
distinct advantage in the early hours after a response to bridge existing gaps 
between the multiple levels of response required.  
 In June of 2004, the member nations of the G8 held a summit hosted by 
the United States at Sea Island Georgia.  This event framed an efficient construct 
of how a single military command can direct both federal and state assets.  This 
Joint Task Force (JTF) was commanded by the Adjutant General of the State of 
Georgia under Title 32 status.  Figure 29 (NGB, J3 DO ARNG-ANG-CNGB G8 
Brief, 2004, p. 34) illustrates the lines of command and coordination for this 
unique situation.  The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the 
President and the Governor lays out the relationships very well. It states: 
The dual status commander will receive orders from a federal chain 
of command and a state chain of command.  As such, the dual 
status commander is an intermediate link in two distinct, separate 
chains of command flowing through different sovereigns.  While the 
dual status commander may receive orders from two chains of 
command, those chains of command must recognize and respect 
the dual status commander’s duty to exercise all authority in a 
completely mutually exclusive manner, i.e., either in a federal or 
state capacity, but never in both capacities at the same time. (NGB, 
MOU Concerning Use of Dual Status Commander for G8 Support 
Mission, 2004, p. 1) 
 
Figure 29. G8 C2 Structure  
 
This unique command relationship is further codified in the MOU as it lays out the 
relationships between the state, USNORTHCOM and the JTF commander. 
Regarding state command and control it states: 
The Georgia Governor, through his Adjutant General, will provide 
command and control over the supporting National Guard forces.  
As a member of the Georgia National Guard in state status, the 
dual status commander takes orders from the Governor through the 
Adjutant General or the State of Georgia.  The dual status 
commander, acting pursuant to state authority, may issue orders to 
National Guard forces serving in state status (Title 32 or State 
Active Duty). (NGB, MOU Concerning Use of Dual Status 
Commander for G8 Support Mission, 2004, p. 1) 
Regarding the federal role of the same dual status commander, the MOU states: 
CDRUSNORTHCOM will provide command and control over the 
supporting federal forces.  The dual status commander, as a 
federal officer activated under Title 10 (of the U.S. Code), takes 
orders from the President or those federal officers the President 
and Secretary of Defense have ordered to act on their behalf.  The 
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dual status commander, acting pursuant to federal authority, may 
issue orders to federal forces, i.e. active duty forces and activated 
reserve forces (including federalized National Guard forces).  Law 
enforcement activities are not to be performed by federal forces in 
support of the G8 in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. (NGB, 
MOU Concerning Use of Dual Status Commander for G8 Support 
Mission, 2004, p. 2) 
Placing the JTF under the command of a dual status commander, a National 
Guard Adjutant General, highlights the dual nature of the National Guard.  The 
MOU highlights the benefits of utilizing the National Guard in this way.  It states: 
Utilizing a dual status commander allows the efficient use of both 
federal and state authorities to execute authorized missions in 
support of federal agencies for the G8 Summit.  This relationship 
will capitalize on military expertise of both sovereign military forces, 
reduce duplicative effort, provide synergy, and ensure unity of 
command.  The dual status commander will have enhanced 
situational awareness through this dual status, and both federal and 
state chains of command will have a common operating picture. 
(NGB, MOU Concerning Use of Dual Status Commander for G8 
Support Mission, 2004, p. 2) 
The JTF operation in support of the G8 mission by all accounts was a 
success.  This type of dual status relationship is sure to be repeated as it flows 
logically from the complex relationship between the states and territories and the 
federal government.  If resourced and given the mission, the National Guard CST 
team has the legal authority and the foundational equipment to bridge both the 
technology divide and the divide in authority lines between the local, state and 
federal agencies charged with incident response and consequence management.   
Given the manpower and the equipment to augment the current mission of the 
CST communications section, the National Guard CST teams could begin to 
bridge the divide between the disparate FM, UHF, satellite and data networks.  It 
is through pilot programs and demonstrations such as NEDIS, the extended 
range WLAN, ESRI Notifier and AEAS that the National Guard CST 
communications capability could be exercised and woven into the way our nation 
responds to a crisis.  This on-scene communications capability, tied together with 
the multiple operations centers and networks through a construct such as the 
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JCCSE, could provide the information technology support required for the dual 
status commander and his or her dual chains of command.  
Once the decision has been made to implement JCCSE, a structured 
engineering process should be undertaken for the development of the physical 
system.  As illustrated by this thesis, the requirements and interfaces for any one 
national IT response system are extremely complex and functional needs must 
be accurately identified to support early iterations of design.  According to 
Blanchard and Fabrycky the traditional engineering design methods: 
…are based on a bottoms-up approach.  Starting with a known set 
of elements, design engineers create a product or system by 
synthesizing a combination of system elements.  However, it is 
unlikely that the functional need will be met on the first attempt 
unless the system is simple. (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1998, p. 28) 
In contrast, according to Blanchard and Fabrycky, the systems engineering 
approach is a more directed methodology which is based on: 
…a top down approach to design.  Starting with the requirements 
about the external behavior of any part of the system (expressed in 
terms of the function provided by that part), that behavior is 
analyzed to identify its functional characteristics.  These functional 
behaviors are then described in more detail and made specific 
through refinement.  Finally the appropriateness of this choice of 
functional components is verified by synthesizing the original part.  
(Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1998, p. 28) 
Figure 30 (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1998, p. 27) illustrates quite well the 
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Figure 30:  Systems Engineering Process 
 
Figure 30 demonstrates how first the team must understand the objectives as 
defined by the identified need.  In this thesis, there are a number of identified 
needs at all tiers of the incident response structure.  These needs can be 
categorized broadly as types of vertical and horizontal communication.  Once the 
objectives are understood, perhaps the single most important aspect of the 
process begins.  This aspect is requirements definition.  Although not shown in 
Figure 30, it is essential that this step be revisited throughout the process to 
continually refine the requirements.  This process should be supported through 
the Integrated Product Team (IPT) process, with the IPT being made up of 
representatives from the many requirements owners and members of the design 
team.  Once the requirements are defined, metrics are identified to measure your 
system against those requirements and then design, testing and integration 
begin.  
 Due to the complexity and size of the JCCSE system, a mixed engineering 
approach utilizing both methodologies would result in the most efficient design.  
Since this construct is so large and complex, the systems engineering approach 
should be utilized to partition JCCSE into its elements.  An example of one 
JCCSE element is the incident response communication element.   Once the 
construct is broken down into its elements, the bottom up design can be utilized  
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to capitalize on existing infrastructure to synthesize products to meet the 
functional requirements of that element.  These elements can then be combined 
into the overall JCCSE. 
As the United States prepares itself for the inevitable, the next terrorist 
incident, it becomes essential that those charged with protecting our country 
have a common operating picture.  Through multiple simulations run in different 
localities, the concept of providing that common operating picture at the highest 
levels can be demonstrated and the lessons learned can be utilized to begin 
intelligence fusion within the various operations centers.  It is apparent that the 
information is available, but through divides created both by technology and 
technique, that information is either lost or clouded in delivery.  If America is to be 
effective in fighting terrorism at home and abroad, it is essential that we give our 
decision makers the tools and accurate information required to make timely and 






































VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This thesis has shown some of the many areas that must be addressed if 
the United States is to bridge the incident response digital divide.  It is as 
important that those who decide the course our country takes in its response to 
disaster have an accurate picture of how we respond today as it is for those 
actually responding to have an accurate picture of what situation exists and what 
assets are available.  It is recommended that the National Guard be utilized as 
envisioned by our forefathers to defend and secure the homeland, and that it be 
resourced appropriately.  There are many initiatives underway that begin to build 
on our strengths as a nation and that expose our weaknesses. The data in this 
thesis demonstrates the current capabilities existing within the United States for 
incident response at the local, state and federal levels.  Further study should be 
given to identify those specific gaps that exist between our current capabilities 
and our desired end state. 
 It is recommended that further study be given to the following areas: 
1. Analysis of the redundancies in the EOC systems 
2. Bridging the communications gap at the incident site 
3. Bridging the communications gap at the EOC level and higher 
4. Information mining and knowledge management in support of 
incident response 
An in depth analysis of the EOC communications systems would expose 
many redundancies and additional touch points that could be leveraged to 
minimize the cost of bridging the response systems together.  Many of those 
redundancies could be targeted for elimination, though an understanding of what 
consequences would occur due to those eliminations must occur prior to any 
action.  It is important to note that some redundancy is required in order to 
provide continuity of operations should critical infrastructure be targeted. 
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It is recommended that additional study be given to identifying the 
communications gaps at the incident site.  It is critical to understand how the 
fiscal and policy decisions that are made exacerbate that gap.  Some of the 
communications gaps will be due to interoperability problems between the 
different response networks caused by technology and some will be caused by 
policy.  Both of these need further study and an in-depth gap analysis. 
Throughout the United States there are thousands of networks and 
hundreds of agencies that are charged with homeland defense and homeland 
security.  It is recommended that further study be given to how we can bridge the 
communications gap at the EOC level and higher to efficiently manage resources 
and provide the incident commander with the appropriate mix of response at the 
appropriate time and at the appropriate place.  Many localities have established 
mutual aid pacts that speed response from their neighboring towns and counties, 
but this model does not efficiently extend beyond the state borders in the event a 
national response is required.   
Having information and the ability to deliver it is important, however 
lacking the understanding of what the information really represents makes all of 
the effort to gather and deliver it moot.  It is recommended that further study be 
given to how we can mine the information from the incident site and the EOC and 
bridge the communications gap in order to provide a common operating picture 
at all levels of government, from the Governor to the President, in order to have 
an understanding of the entire scenario that may be unfolding. In this way the 
graduated response can be properly applied strategically in order to avoid critical 
shortages and or delays in implementation that will certainly cost human lives. 
This thesis’ final recommendation is that an in depth demonstration or pilot 
be undertaken where two way data flow be achieved from multiple incident sites 
to the local EOC, the state EOC and JFHQ State JOC, the NGB JOC, the 
USNORTHCOM and USPACOM JOCs and the Homeland Security operations 
center.  That pilot should demonstrate the JCCSE concept and more importantly, 
demonstrate the ability to fuse information and intelligence from disparate 
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sources.  It should implement the accepted response plans at all levels and 
should be measured against pre-defined metrics that demonstrate our strengths 
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